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This thesis examines the possibilities for women’s empowerment through 
microfinance. It utilizes the results of a survey conducted in 2009 with clients of the 
microfinance organization FINCA Honduras. The analysis of these survey results yields 
important conclusions on FINCA Honduras’ ability to empower Honduran women 
economically, psychologically, and socio-culturally. The original hypothesis of this study 
stated that FINCA Honduras’ financial services would help the female client to improve 
her standard of living, her psychological well-being, and her gender relationships in the 
home. FINCA Honduras has partially succeeded in empowering its female clients in 
these ways, but currently lacks the specific tools and/or motivations to fully empower 
women through its services. The findings presented by this thesis offer evidence against 
microfinance’s ability to automatically empower the female client, and consequently 



































 The development and completion of this thesis would not have been possible 
without the guidance of Professor Robert Gay, my thesis advisor and professor of four 
years. Thank you for your wisdom throughout these past months, and for your strong 
insights that have helped me to make this thesis coherent. You have taught me to 
continually scrutinize my own work, and to always maintain an open mind and a sense of 
humor about my writing. I am also exceptionally grateful for the guidance of Professor 
Maria Cruz-Saco, my second reader for this thesis. Thank you for your expertise in the 
field of microfinance and your great enthusiasm on the subject. You have been a source 
of inspiration for me in my ongoing investigation of microfinance and its possibilities. 
 
I would also like to thank the coordinators of the Toor Cummings Center for 
International Studies and the Liberal Arts (CISLA), Mary Devins, Dorothy Wang, and 
Robert Gay, who have provided me with the invaluable opportunity to spend the summer 
of 2009 as an intern with FINCA Honduras. You have given me the tools to discover my 
passions, to expand my knowledge, and to develop my independence, and without your 
guidance throughout the past three years I would not be the person I am today. 
 
 In addition, the primary research that has been used in this thesis would not have 
been collected without the help of Alexi Taylor-Grosman, Liz Freudenberger, and the 
staff of FINCA International’s research team. Thank you for granting me the opportunity 
to utilize the FCAT survey during my internship with FINCA Honduras, and for trusting 
me with the essential tools and programs that made the administration of this survey 
possible. I am also grateful for your flexibility in inviting me to participate in FCAT 
orientations and data presentations in 2009, which have helped me significantly in the 
administration and analysis of this survey data. 
 
 I am thankful as well for the continual support of my family and friends, who 
have provided me with important feedback on this thesis and with the encouragement that 
I have needed to complete my work. To my parents and sister—thank you for your 
positivity and for helping me to bring stress back into perspective. To Nayan Pokhrel—
thank you for your smart insights on the pitfalls of microfinance and for your comments 
on my writing. To my friends who have spent countless hours in the library with me, 
among whom I include Meghana Srinivasan, Michael Gardner, Alexandra Felfle, Amani 
Zaveri, Elizabeth Baily, Alexander Dana, and Sarah Howe—thank you for your 
wonderful humor and encouragement. 
 
 Finally, I would like to thank the 170 Honduran women and men who graciously 
completed the FCAT survey with me in June and July of 2009. Your wisdom and your 
willingness to express your opinions have brought life to my investigation on 
microfinance, women, and empowerment. Thank you for allowing me the amazing 
opportunity to conduct primary research and for contributing to the data that has formed 
the core of this thesis. May success in small business be the first of many goals that you 
are able to reach. 
 
!Table of Contents 
 
Introduction                                                                                                                          1 
 
Chapter 1: History and Development of Microfinance 
 Microfinance’s Beginnings: Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank               5 
 Microfinance’s Global Spread                                                                                 9 
 Lending Strategies: Development and Debate                                                       11 
 Microfinance in Latin America                                                                              18 
 References                                                                                                              22 
 
Chapter 2: The Question of Empowerment 
 Defining Empowerment                                                                                         24 
 Incidence and Feasibility of Economic Empowerment                                         26 
 Incidence and Feasibility of Psychological Empowerment                                   29 
 Incidence and Feasibility of Socio-cultural Empowerment                                   31 
 References                                                                                                              35 
 
Chapter 3: Honduran Context 
 Honduras Overview                                                                                               37 
 Political History and Current Status                                                                      38 
 Economic History and Current Status                                                                    41 
 Social Norms: The Continual Subordination of Women                                       44  
 References                                                                                                              48 
 
Chapter 4: FINCA Honduras and Survey Methodology 
 FINCA Honduras                                                                                                   49 
 Interning with FINCA                                                                                            51 
 The FINCA Survey                                                                                                53 
 References                                                                                                              57 
 
Chapter 5: Findings 
 FINCA and Economic Empowerment                                                                   58 
 FINCA and Psychological Empowerment                                                             82 
 FINCA and Socio-cultural Empowerment                                                             89 
 References                                                                                                              96 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusions                                                                                                      97 
 




If you give a man a fish, you feed him for a day. 




 In an age of globalization and increasing global disparity between rich and poor, 
the world has seen the rise of a new and celebrated poverty-fighting strategy in past 
decades: microfinance. Microfinance organizations, by definition, provide financial 
services to poor entrepreneurs, most commonly small loans to help poor individuals start 
or grow small businesses. Microfinance also includes the provision of other services such 
as savings opportunities and micro-insurance to the poor. Since its beginnings in the 
1970s, microfinance has spread exponentially worldwide with the backing of countless 
governments and influential international organizations such as the United Nations and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It has been endorsed and applied in developing 
countries from Bangladesh to Bolivia as a hopeful cure for economic inequality. This 
poverty-fighting strategy has also specifically been praised for its sustainability—instead 
of functioning as a charity, it aims to provide poor individuals with the tools to pull 
themselves out of poverty and sustain their financial success. The great faith that the 
world has placed in microfinance in recent years has made it seem the panacea for world 
poverty. Its impact on the alleviation of poverty on a grand scale has yet to be assessed, 
but important changes have occurred at the individual level for microfinance clients as 
they improve their financial stability and standard of living through small enterprise.  
 Microfinance has become popular not only for its alleged ability to combat 
poverty but for its potential to empower the microfinance client, especially those clients 
who are women. In many of the developing countries where microfinance has become 
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prevalent, gender inequalities play a powerful role in societal structure and contribute 
greatly to the nation’s poverty and underdevelopment. The possibility of empowering 
women and granting them greater economic, psychological, and social agency through a 
simple loan therefore makes microfinance a compelling initiative at the micro and the 
macro level. Empowering an individual woman in a third world nation not only grants 
her greater independence and control over her life, but may also contribute to the well-
being of her family and in part to the alleviation of poverty in her country. It is on this 
platform of the simultaneous alleviation of poverty and empowerment of women that 
many microfinance organizations have promoted their work and gained financial support. 
But much research still remains to be done on microfinance’s individual and collective 
impact among the poor. We must continue to investigate the exact ways in which 
microfinance works as a tool to reverse poverty and to empower the individual before we 
can make claims on its worldwide success. 
 This thesis will address the specific impact of the non-profit microfinance 
organization FINCA Honduras on its female clients, in terms of economic, psychological, 
and socio-cultural changes in their lives. When I began my research on this topic, I was 
interested in how exactly empowerment could be achieved for women through the simple 
provision of microloans and other financial services. I started with a high level of 
optimism on microfinance’s ability to impact the poor female client, but also wanted to 
investigate firsthand the true feasibility of empowerment for female clients of 
microfinance institutions. I was interested in learning about the individual struggles and 
advances of women as recipients of microloans and their stories of success or failure. I 
was granted this opportunity through an internship from June to August of 2009 with 
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FINCA Honduras. As my primary task for this internship, I was given a standardized 
survey to administer with clients on their standard of living, confidence, and satisfaction 
with the organization, among other indicators. This survey was part of a series of surveys 
created by FINCA International to measure the organization’s impact on its clients. I will 
use the data collected from this survey to present my own findings on one Honduran 
microfinance organization and its ability to empower the women it serves. 
 This thesis will be organized by the following chapters. In my first chapter, I will 
discuss the history and development of microfinance as a poverty-fighting strategy since 
its beginnings in the 1970s, touching on microfinance’s global spread, the variety of 
lending strategies and financial models that have evolved among microfinance 
institutions over the years, and the specific Latin American model of microfinance. In 
Chapter Two, I will address the specific meaning of female “empowerment” in its three 
facets—economic, psychological, and socio-cultural—and its feasibility through 
microfinance as previously investigated worldwide, highlighting the current debates 
among microfinance scholars on empowerment possibilities for women. Chapter Three 
will provide an economic, political, and social background of the country of Honduras, 
discussing the specific struggles that have led Honduras to its underdeveloped status 
today. In my fourth chapter I will outline the essential characteristics of FINCA Honduras 
as a microfinance organization, and I will present the methodology that I used in my 
administration of the FINCA survey with clients in Honduras in June and July 2009, 
providing specifics on my internship with the organization and on the survey’s format. 
Chapter Five will present a detailed and statistical analysis of my collected data on the 
female clients of FINCA Honduras and the organization’s economic, psychological, and 
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socio-cultural impact on their lives. Finally, in my seventh and last chapter I will discuss 
my conclusions on FINCA’s success in empowering its female clients and its general 
success as a microfinance organization. I will offer suggestions for the betterment of 
FINCA’s services and, based on the aggregation of my research in this thesis, I will 




















CHAPTER ONE: HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF MICROFINANCE 
 
Microfinance’s Beginnings: Muhammad Yunus and The Grameen Bank 
 The idea of granting small loans to the poor had its most famous beginnings in 
1974 with a Bangladeshi economist by the name of Muhammad Yunus. Yunus was the 
head of the economics department at Bangladesh’s Chittagong University, and when a 
devastating famine struck his country in 1974, he began to feel frustrated with the 
abstract economic theories that he taught to his students daily.1 He wanted to find a 
practical solution to starvation and poverty, one that did not rely on academic notions of 
“trickle-down” effects but that came from the people themselves. Yunus began to study 
economics from what he called a “worm’s eye view”: in the city streets, with “the people 
as his professors”.2 It was through this research on poverty and its sources that he arrived 
at the notion that the fair provision of credit to poor entrepreneurs could make every 
difference in their survival. In 1976, Yunus granted the first microloan in Bangladesh—
only twenty-seven dollars—to forty-two bamboo stool weavers in the village of Jobra.3 
 From the time of this first microloan to the Grameen Bank’s official certification 
as a financial institution in 1983, Yunus and his coworkers created a widely replicated 
micro-lending model that focused on the provision of group loans to mostly female 
clients in the poorest sector of society. According to Yunus, client group membership 
ensured higher repayment of loans and provided necessary mutual support and 
opportunities to learn collectively. He asserted that “subtle and at times not-so-subtle peer 
pressure” and “a sense of intergroup and intragroup competition” were mechanisms that 
would motivate each client to handle her credit in a timely and responsible way.4 The 
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failure of one individual had the potential to affect the eligibility of the entire group for 
its next loan, while a group’s collective success would allow all of its members to 
increase their subsequent loan sizes. He also emphasized that group members could help 
each other in the repayment of their loans if a certain individual met economic 
difficulties.5 The group would learn together how to manage their businesses more 
effectively, sharing strategies and encouragement. Thus the solidarity group became the 
smart model for lending money to vulnerable clients who had no previous credit 
experience. Just as Yunus had a specific reason for the use of groups, he saw the 
extension of microloans to women as a strategic necessity. 
 In Bangladesh and in locations worldwide where microfinance has flourished 
since the start of the Grameen Bank, the focus on women has proved essential in making 
a strong impact on financial gender equality and on the alleviation of poverty at the 
individual and familial level. When Muhammad Yunus first advocated for women as the 
primary clients of his microfinance program, he pointed out that the formal banking 
system had clearly been “created for men”—women were not authorized to take out a 
loan from a bank without the presence of a man, and were therefore kept from financial 
independence or self-advancement by the local system.6 By granting women the right to 
credit, Yunus saw that he could alleviate this gender inequality while also fighting 
poverty in the most widespread and effective way. He explains in Banker to the Poor, 
“Not only do women constitute the majority of the poor, the underemployed, and the 
economically and socially disadvantaged, but they more readily and successfully improve 
the welfare of both children and men. Studies comparing how male borrowers use their 
loans versus female borrowers consistently show this to be the case”.7 It was for these 
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reasons that Yunus’ microfinance, with its inherent goal of poverty alleviation, became 
clearly focused on women—as the poorest population and the most selfless providers for 
their families, women were the perfect clients for microloans. With their success, new 
generations and entire communities could potentially be guaranteed a higher standard of 
living and a greater chance for the future. 
 Yunus also had a tactical reason for reaching clients at the absolute lowest 
poverty level—not only because they deserved the right to credit most, but because they 
proved unprecedentedly faithful in their repayment of loans and responsibility with their 
credit. Before the Grameen Bank, all other formal banking institutions had viewed the 
poor as the riskiest clients and therefore unfit for financial services. But Muhammad 
Yunus declared that the poor would pay back their loans unlike any other clients, because 
they would value the money more and would monitor its use with great care. A small 
Grameen loan would be the “one and only chance” for a poor individual to escape 
destitution.8 According to these early microfinance theories, clients from the poorest 
sectors of society appreciate highly the trust of a microfinance organization and will do 
whatever they can to hold on to such an opportunity for success. They are so faithful that 
even standard procedures such as collateral are unnecessary—as Yunus highlights, those 
clients who managed their loans without collateral in fact showed a higher repayment rate 
than those who were guaranteed by personal assets.9 With its revolutionary policies, the 
Grameen Bank proved to the world that the poor not only deserved but could also 
manage credit as well as any other financial clients. 
 The original micro-lending model pioneered by the Grameen Bank was 
characterized by low-pressure loan conditions and a cooperative relationship between 
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organization and client that allowed for flexibility of services. The formula for a Grameen 
loans is as follows: Loans last one year, a long loan term compared to most institutions. 
Repayment installments are paid weekly in very small amounts, at two percent of the 
loan amount per week. Finally, the interest rate is two currency units per week for every 
thousand currency units of the loan, which amounts to twenty percent interest over the 
entire year.10 These loan conditions allow vulnerable clients to manage their loans easily 
and without the stress of large repayments at any time, and thus are ideal for 
microfinance that reaches the most poor. In the Grameen model, solidarity groups are 
also required to accumulate small incremental savings collectively. Each member 
deposits five percent of her loan in a group fund over time. If a certain member 
encounters a difficult financial situation, she can take out a loan interest-free from this 
group fund upon the agreement of her group.11 Such measures allow clients to learn the 
value of saving together and to create a cushion for themselves in the event of a crisis. 
Finally, Grameen clients are given the flexibility to modify their specific loan conditions 
depending on their performance and on environmental circumstances. Long-term clients 
who prove themselves as dependable borrowers can be granted new, larger loans for 
purposes outside of business, such as home construction.12 If a client lives through an 
economic crisis or a natural disaster, on the other hand, her old loan is given an extra long 
term that can be paid in smaller increments, but her loan will not be wiped out 
altogether.13 With this combination of stress-free and flexible strategies, the Grameen 
Bank model of microfinance became the widely praised and replicated way to 
successfully provide credit to the poor.  
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 Muhammad Yunus would soon see his revolutionary idea taking hold around the 
world. Since 1976, microfinance institutions and strategies have grown substantially and 
have adapted to the specific environments of the countries in which they work. Today, a 
variety of debates have emerged concerning the most effective microfinance models and 
the specific goals and purposes that microfinance organizations should focus on. We will 
now examine the spread and development of microfinance over time, and the essential 
differences that exist today among its leading institutions. 
 
Microfinance’s Global Spread 
 In the mid-1970s, as Muhammad Yunus was first forming the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh, similar ideas for micro-lending and assisting poor entrepreneurs were 
forming in Latin America. In Brazil in 1972, Projeto Uno began providing working 
capital loans to the owners of small businesses. Low interest rate and other easy loan 
conditions to help the poorest clients were not the focus of Projeto Uno, but this 
organization was the first to provide loans through a system of loan officers who worked 
closely and personally with clients, a model which prevails today in many microfinance 
institutions.14 ACCION International, a poverty-fighting volunteer organization that 
started in Caracas, Venezuela in 1961, began issuing microloans to clients in 1973. In the 
next decade, ACCION would help to establish microfinance institutions in over fourteen 
countries throughout Latin America.15 One of these organizations was the world-
recognized BancoSol of Bolivia, the first non-governmental microfinance institution to 
become a formal regulated bank, which originated in response to an extreme economic 
crisis and urban unemployment. 16 Microfinance continued to spread through Latin 
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America, to Colombia where the minimalist micro-lending institution Fundación Carvajal 
began its programs in 1978 and to the Dominican Republic where Banco Ademi created a 
loan fund for small street salesmen around the same time.17 The Latin American model of 
microfinance soon took on a specific form of its own which we will discuss below.   
 In the 1990s, microfinance organizations and networks that had begun in Latin 
America and Asia began to expand their programs into Africa, Eastern Europe, the 
Middle East, and even to more developed, first world countries. Between 1990 and 1995, 
FINCA International (Foundation for International Community Assistance), a 
microfinance network that was founded in Bolivia, began new programs in Uganda and 
Kyrgyzstan. Today, FINCA directs affiliates in five African countries, seven Eurasian 
countries, and two Middle Eastern countries in addition to its original Latin American 
branches.18 The Bangladesh Rehabilitations Assistance Committee (BRAC), which gave 
its first loans in Bangladesh in 1974, developed programs in Africa in 1994 and now 
works in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone.19 Microfinance is now a global phenomenon that has been 
widely accepted as an important way to reach out to the world’s poor. Today, the World 
Bank estimates that over seven thousand microfinance institutions serve approximately 
sixteen million people worldwide.20 For those who work in microfinance, the question is 
no longer if small loans have the potential to help the poor, but how and to whom these 





Lending Strategies: Development and Debate   
 Since the Grameen Bank presented its initial formula for micro-lending through 
group loans and a focus on women from the poorest communities, much of microfinance 
strategy has been reformed and rethought by new institutions. The majority of 
microfinance organizations have in fact now departed from a non-profit, charitable focus 
to more of a business outlook on the services that they provide. Today we can highlight 
four major debates over the intended mission and structure of micro-lending as an 
initiative. The first is whether group or individual loans are more effective in helping 
clients to improve their businesses and lives. The second is whether microfinance 
institutions should focus their services on the absolute poor or on the relative poor as 
clients. The third debate centers on the sole provision of credit versus the provision of 
credit as well as other financial services and training. Finally, the fourth debate asks 
whether microfinance organizations should continue their original non-profit mission or 
become commercialized and make profit from their clients. Upon review of these 
debates, it is clear that each perspective possesses distinct benefits and pitfalls, both for 
organizations and clients themselves. 
 As Muhammad Yunus outlines in Banker to the Poor, the clear benefits of group 
loans lie in group solidarity and support and the placement of responsibility and power in 
the clients’ hands. Group pressure motivates clients to pay back their loans in a timely 
fashion, therefore avoiding the need for client hassling by the institution. Group members 
can support each other in times of economic trouble and thus can build up a positive 
credit history together as a collective.21 As Malcolm Harper emphasizes in “What’s 
Wrong with Groups?” group membership provides individuals with an easier and more 
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organized way to begin saving their money. It also gives many women the opportunity to 
leave the home and participate in a social collective for the first time, allowing them new 
confidence and agency, while taking responsibility and extra work out of the hands of the 
organization.22 Group loaning systems still dominate the strategy of certain organizations, 
namely Grameen-affiliated programs and branches of the FINCA network, and remain 
most effective in rural and extremely poor areas.23 
 A newer argument for the provision of individual credit focuses on the freedom 
that an individual loan gives the client in terms of money, time, and responsibility. 
Harper points out that group loans are inflexible, often fixing loan sizes at values that are 
too low and loan terms on cycles that are too long in the eyes of clients. Group meetings 
pose a significant time burden for many women who work around the clock at their small 
businesses in order to sustain their families and pay back their credit. They must close 
their shops for an hour or more to attend weekly meetings, and thus lose essential 
business. Finally, membership in a group gives extra, unwanted responsibility to each 
client—the need to look out for weaker members or guarantee the larger loans of the 
strongest members.24 On the contrary, individual clients can take out loans that are much 
higher because they are not pulled down by the vulnerability of others in their group. 
They can decide their loan terms personally without having to make limiting 
compromises. An individual client is responsible only for herself and has more time to 
grow her enterprise. This individual loan model has been adapted by a large number of 
microfinance institutions today, including BancoSol of Bolivia and other ACCION 
International affiliates, and has been considered ideal for the moderately poor client.25 
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This distinction between moderately and extremely poor clients brings us to the next 
debate among microfinance theorists. 
 The justification for designing microfinance programs to serve the poorest 
populations remains simple: Muhammad Yunus proved the poor to be reliable clients, 
and they are the most in need of access to credit and formal assistance. As previously 
discussed, the Grameen Bank model demonstrated in the 1970s that very poor individuals 
took their loans seriously and worked harder than any other client group to pay them back 
responsibly. Collateral was not even a necessity to guarantee the faithfulness of these 
highly vulnerable clients.26 In addition, many microfinance institutions see service to the 
most poor as a moral imperative. The rhetoric of microfinance speaks of goals to 
eradicate poverty worldwide, and it could be considered “false advertising” for an 
organization to preach such rhetoric while simultaneously ignoring the lowest sector of 
the poor population.27 As David Hulme clarifies in “Is microdebt good for poor people?” 
those clients whose standard of living truly lies below national poverty lines are the most 
in need of microfinance’s services. They are the most vulnerable to crisis and the most 
plagued by a basic lack of human rights and survival tools.28 Therefore, it has been 
argued that these extremely poor clients must be the first priority of every microfinance 
institution—as Muhammad Yunus declared when he first started the Grameen Bank, a 
small loan could truly make the difference in their survival. 
 In past decades, a newer argument for serving the relatively poor instead of the 
extreme poor has emerged among microfinance theorists and institutions, which declares 
that debt is too risky and damaging for the poorest members of society and that a 
microfinance organization can work much more efficiently if it serves the relatively poor. 
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Weiss and Montgomery argue that high repayment rate among the poorest clients does 
not necessarily reflect the capacity to pay, but instead could be a symptom of excessive 
social pressure and even fear. “Microdebt” poses an extreme risk and source of stress for 
the very vulnerable poor who have no resources or monetary cushion to fall back on. 
Weiss and Montgomery therefore suggest that microfinance is not the ideal mechanism to 
assist the most poor and that programs such as food subsidies or workfare would be more 
effective.29 Serving the relatively poor instead of the extreme poor is also seen as more 
beneficial for microfinance organizations. Less training and support is needed for 
relatively poor clients because most of them already own small businesses and possess 
entrepreneurial skills. The relatively poor are viewed as less risky and can provide 
collateral, and therefore the institution can guarantee the repayment of its clients’ loans 
and can work towards financial sustainability.30 For these reasons—client service and 
organizational efficiency—many microfinance institutions have departed from the 
historical focus on the extreme poor to a more practical client base of the relatively poor. 
 The third debate among microfinance theorists focuses on the range of services 
that a microfinance institution should provide. One side of the debate reflects a 
minimalist approach, stating that the sole responsibility of a microfinance organization 
should be to provide credit to its clients. This argument rests on the belief that credit 
alone, and the consequential increased income for an entrepreneur, can empower the 
client to become a more confident and proactive individual. (This issue of empowerment 
will be central to our later discussion.) Economic assistance is more than enough for 
clients, argue minimalist theorists, and any further financial or social services such as 
savings programs or health care should not be the responsibility of a microfinance 
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organization as they lie outside of the organization’s realm of work.31 Other NGOs 
should focus on the specific services beyond microcredit, and microfinance institutions 
should keep their programs simple, focusing on their true mission: providing credit to the 
poor. 
 A variety of microfinance institutions worldwide have begun to provide additional 
services beyond basic credit to their clients, citing the emerging argument that 
microfinance cannot combat gender inequality if it is not accompanied by a 
comprehensive program of assistance for the poor women that it serves. Credit and 
increased income only bring women halfway to empowerment, these theorists assert. 
Hulme suggests the diversification of financial services which microfinance 
organizations provide: “flexible savings, contractual savings, loans for education and 
health, microinsurance and lines of credit.”32 He argues that just as poor women have 
been barred from credit by formal banks, they have been barred from the variety of 
services mentioned above and need and deserve those services equally. Only with such 
diversification will poor microfinance clients have full power over their financial lives. 
Matin, Sulaiman, and Saleque stress in “Imagining microfinance more boldly” that 
microfinance institutions should in fact provide health care to clients by selecting and 
training local health workers in their clients’ communities.33 Linda Mayoux advocates for 
the provision of education on gender equality, stating that microfinance organizations 
should provide “awareness training in gender issues for men and women to ensure that 
microfinance leads to positive changes in women’s position rather than exacerbating 
domestic conflict.”34 Many microfinance organizations have begun to operate some or all 
of these additional services as part of their outreach package, in hopes of addressing 
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issues of gender equality and female empowerment more comprehensively and 
effectively. These “credit-plus” models of microfinance have been said to take an 
organization’s social impact to the next level and to make its empowerment rhetoric more 
valid. 
 Finally we come to the debate over non-profit versus commercialized 
microfinance institutions. The first microfinance providers, including the Grameen Bank, 
were non-profit organizations, and many continue a non-profit mission today, citing the 
importance of sustainability and of treating the poor fairly as clients. Modern affiliates of 
Grameen and FINCA, for example, call themselves “sustainable” because they cover all 
costs of operation without retaining significant capital. These organizations maintain 
themselves primarily by large donor contributions, and due to disinterest in profit they are 
able to offer low interest rates and flexible loan terms to their clients.35 The ideological 
justification for sustainability rests on the assertion that making a profit from the poor is 
exploitative and morally wrong. Theorists who advocate for sustainability state that 
newer, commercialized institutions are guilty of a “mission drift”—abandonment of the 
original microfinance mission and of the people it should serve. Marguerite Berger writes 
that commercialized organizations over-expand their client bases in search of profit, but 
in doing so place the quantity of clients over the quality of service provided to those 
clients.36 Weiss and Montgomery point out that for-profit microfinance institutions that 
are regulated by formal banking systems must adhere to “tighter commercial criteria” that 
will exclude poor clients from participation.37 Therefore, those institutions that wish to 
remain loyal to the poor and to follow Muhammad Yunus’ original micro-lending 
mission have maintained a non-profit structure. 
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 Commercialized, for-profit microfinance has risen in popularity in the past two 
decades and has been supported by many microfinance theorists for two reasons: the 
ability to reach more clients and the ability to provide a wider range of financial services 
to clients. These organizations assert that the extra capital gained from commercialization 
gives them the financial power and reach to serve a much greater number of clients, thus 
providing credit and other services to many more people who would not have received 
them otherwise.38 Theorists who support the for-profit method of microfinance counter 
the common argument that quality of service is undermined by commercialization by 
pointing out that commercialized institutions have a greater capacity to provide services 
beyond credit to their clients. The provision of savings accounts, microinsurance, and 
other financial services which clients so often demand of microfinance organizations 
often requires a banking license and thus the switch to formal, for-profit operation.39 
Many microfinance organizations have seen this as a necessary change: becoming a 
commercialized institution allows them to better adopt the popular “credit-plus” model of 
micro-lending discussed above. Today, for-profit microfinance organizations have 
become powerful actors on the world stage: according to 2005 statistics, 45 of the top 
specialized microfinance institutions worldwide outperform the top 10 global banking 
institutions.40 Whether this grand success is a triumph for microfinance or a corruption of 
its original goals and rhetoric remains a constant source of dispute. 
 It has been over seventy-five years since microfinance first took root in 
Bangladesh, Brazil, and beyond, and it has evolved into a multifaceted industry whose 
strategies vary widely. The debates over group versus individual loans, service to the 
extreme poor versus to the relatively poor, the provision of simple credit versus varied 
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financial services, and sustainability versus profitability all demonstrate through their 
costs and benefits that there is no one way to operate as a microfinance institution. From 
these variations in strategy and rhetoric we learn that microfinance has become a word 
with multiple meanings and that its original form cannot be preserved. We now turn to 
the Latin American model of microfinance, and the specific strategies that have 
developed and prevailed in this region. 
 
Microfinance in Latin America 
 Historically, microfinance institutions throughout Latin America have followed 
the individual lending model and have served the relative poor over the extreme poor. 
These two characteristics can be traced back to the first successful microfinance 
organization in Latin America, BancoSol of Bolivia. This institution began as a response 
to vast urban unemployment during the collapse of the Bolivian federal government in 
the 1970s. BancoSol operated to provide credit to individual urban entrepreneurs, who 
already possessed business skills but needed assistance to regain their livelihoods.41 
BancoSol set the stage for other Latin American microfinance organizations, and today 
individual loans to relatively poor clients are the trend in Latin America. As of 2006 only 
ten percent of microloans in Latin America were given to groups, mostly from FINCA 
affiliates and the Mexican institution Compartamos. In addition, because three-quarters of 
the population of Latin America lives in urban areas, relatively poor urban clients have 
been the great focus of microfinance services in this region.42 According to Berger in An 
Inside View of Latin American Microfinance, serving the most poor is usually not seen 
as the industry’s goal in Latin America, as most microfinance organizations aim to 
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strengthen those who are already participants in the informal economy. However, there 
exist prominent organizations in the region that specifically focus on the poorest female 
clients, such as Mi Banco, which operates in Peru. Thus the Latin American model of 
microfinance represents the full spectrum of lending models and client poverty levels, 
although primarily focusing on relatively poor clients and individual loans.43 
 Latin American microfinance organizations have seen a recent transition from 
non-profit, sustainable institutions that offer simple credit to a growing number of 
commercialized for-profit institutions offering “credit-plus” models with a wide range of 
services. As Berger elucidates, microfinance in Latin America started with institutions 
that were not profit-focused and that relied heavily on private donors to sustain their 
operations. But as these institutions grew, donor dependence became riskier and more 
difficult and profitability became a more practical way to serve the large client bases that 
these organizations had accumulated.44 A number of Latin American microfinance 
providers, such as Compartamos of Mexico and Finamerica of Colombia, have since the 
1990s undergone a process that Berger calls “upgrading”: the conversion of a 
nongovernmental organization into a regulated financial institution that gains profit.45 
Consequently, these organizations have used their new financial capacity to offer 
additional services beyond credit at the request of their clients. More diverse financial 
packages, especially with savings programs, have been adopted by many of these newly 
commercialized organizations. They have also added a variety of services to contribute to 
equality and empowerment, such as “basic educational initiatives in health and literacy”, 
“financial education and business training”, and “management or skills training.”46 While 
the loaning model and client base of Latin American microfinance providers remain 
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relatively static, it is these aspects of commercialization and additional services that have 
been constantly developing over the past decades in the region. 
 It is important to recognize the dangers of recent microfinance commercialization 
in Latin America—microfinance organizations can easily transform into machines for the 
exploitation of the poor as they sell themselves to powerful banks and raise interest rates 
to unethical levels. The legal regulation of a microfinance organization is in fact possible 
without its conversion into a for-profit institution: organizations that operate “credit-plus” 
models and receive savings deposits from their clients must become regulated by formal 
financial institutions for transparency purposes. Thus, many non-profit microfinance 
institutions follow legal financial regulations while maintaining their sustainability and 
low interest rates. However, when a microfinance organization chooses to sell its 
ownership to a commercial bank and earn profit from its clients, the original poverty-
fighting mission of microfinance can be lost. Neil MacFarquhar, in his recent New York 
Times article, reports that sixty percent of today’s microfinance clients worldwide are 
served by banks and finance firms, which generally charge their clients anywhere from 
70 to 125 percent in interest rates. For example, Compartamos, one of Mexico’s largest 
and most successful microfinance institutions, recently earned “$458 million through a 
public stock sale in 2007” and today charges an average of 82 percent interest to its 
clients. Poor clients, tricked by the clever advertising of organizations like Compartamos, 
often find themselves mired in debt. The commercialization of microfinance can lead 
institutions to worsen the poverty of their clients, and therefore we must be wary of its 
recent rise in popularity across Latin America.47 
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 The country of Honduras poses an interesting case in the Latin American world of 
microfinance. Today there exist seventeen operating microfinance institutions in 
Honduras, including FINCA Honduras, ACCION’s affiliate BanCovelo, and World 
Relief. The first microfinance organization to begin operations in Honduras was 
Hermandad de Honduras (HDH) in 1977, but the vast majority of Honduran 
organizations were founded in the 1990s.48 Honduran microfinance is an interesting case 
in the region first because its institutions offer significantly more group loans than in 
most Latin American countries. Organizations like FINCA Honduras and Genesis 
Microfinance follow the solidarity group model that was first pioneered by Muhammad 
Yunus and the Grameen Bank. 49 Secondly, Honduras remains one of the last locations in 
Latin America where non-profit microfinance clearly prevails. Berger elucidates the 
factors that contribute to this continuing non-profit trend: “Only in Colombia and 
Honduras does the non-profit model continue to be the driving force… In Honduras, very 
low levels of required capitalization and the ability of non-profit institutions not regulated 
by the banking authorities to capture deposits has made it easier for NGO microfinance 
institutions to remain as such.”50 In general, the extreme poverty of Honduras in 
comparison with surrounding countries contributes to these differences within the 
microfinance industry in terms of lending models and profitability. Its depressed 
conditions as a nation make it an ideal location for microfinance to meet the needs of 
poor entrepreneurs, while Honduras simultaneously faces difficulties in making its 
microfinance industry grow to the level of influence of its neighbors. These specific 
characteristics of Honduran microfinance provide a context for our discussion and 
investigation of the empowerment of Honduran women through microfinance.  
! 22 
REFERENCES!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Yunus, Muhammad with Alan Jolis. Banker to the Poor: Micro-lending and the battle 
against world poverty. New York: PublicAffairs, 2007. p. viii. 
2 Yunus ix 
3 Yunus 50 
4 Yunus 62 
5 Yunus 63 
6 Yunus 71 
7 Yunus 73 
8 Yunus 58 
9 Ibid 
10 Yunus 68 
11 Yunus 65 
12 Yunus 128 
13 Yunus 137 
14 Berger, Marguerite. “The Latin American Model of Microfinance.” An Inside View of 
Latin American Microfinance. Eds. Marguerite Berger, Lara Goldmark, and Tomás 
Miller-Sanabria. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2006. p. 9. 
15 ACCION International. “ACCION’s History.” 2010. <www.accion.org> 10 Feb 2010. 
16 Weiss, John and Heather Montgomery. “Great Expectations: Microfinance and Poverty 
Reduction in Asia and Latin America.” Oxford Development Studies 33.3 (2005): 391-
416. p. 392. Academic Search Premier Database, 25 Oct 2009.  
17 Berger 11 
18 Foundation for International Community Assistance. “Where we work.” 2010. 
<www.villagebanking.org> 10 Feb 2010. 
19 Bangladesh Rehabilitations Assistance Committee. “Timeline”, “Where we work”. 
2010. <www.brac.net> 10 Feb 2010. 
20 United Nations Capital Development Fund. “The Basics on Microfinance.” 2006. 
<www.globalenvision.org> 10 Feb 2010.  
21 Yunus 63 
22 Harper, Malcolm. “What’s Wrong with Groups?” What’s Wrong with Microfinance? 
Eds. Thomas Dichter and Malcolm Harper. Eastbourne, UK: Intermediate Technology 
Publications Ltd., 2007. pp. 40-41. 
23 Berger 14 
24 Harper 42-43 
25 “From Charity to Business.” The Economist 377.8451 (11/5/2005): 7-10. p. 8. 
Academic Search Premier Database, 11 Feb 2010.  
26 Yunus 58 
27 Hulme, David. “Is microdebt good for poor people? A note on the dark side of 
microfinance.” What’s Wrong with Microfinance? Eds. Thomas Dichter and Malcolm 
Harper. Eastbourne, UK: Intermediate Technology Publications Ltd., 2007. p. 20. 
28 Hulme 21 
29 Weiss and Montgomery 396 
! 23 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Morduch, Jonathan. “The Microfinance Promise.” American Economic Association 
37.4 (1999): 1569-1614. p. 1573. JSTOR Database, 11 Feb 2010.  
31 Mayoux, Linda. “Women’s empowerment and micro-finance programmes: strategies 
for increasing impact.” Development in Practice 8.2 (1998): 235-241. p. 236. Academic 
Search Premier Database, 7 Nov 2009.  
32 Hulme 21 
33 Matin, Imran, Munshi Sulaiman and M.A. Saleque. “Imagining microfinance more 
boldly: Unleashing the true potential of microfinance.” What’s Wrong with 
Microfinance? Eds. Thomas Dichter and Malcolm Harper. Eastbourne, UK: Intermediate 
Technology Publications Ltd., 2007. p. 27. 
34 Mayoux 239 
35 “From Charity to Business.” The Economist 377.8451 (11/5/2005): 7-10. p. 8. 
Academic Search Premier Database, 11 Feb 2010. 
36 Berger 21 
37 Weiss and Montgomery 394 
38 “From Charity to Business.” The Economist 377.8451 (11/5/2005): 7-10. p. 8. 
Academic Search Premier Database, 11 Feb 2010. 
39 Ibid p. 9 
40 Berger 17 
41 Weiss and Montgomery 392 
42 Berger 14 
43 Ibid 
44 Berger 7 
45 Berger 19 
46 Berger 30 
47 MacFarquhar, Niel. “Banks Making Big Profits from Tiny Loans.” New York Times: 
April 13, 2010. <www.nytimes.com> 2 May 2010.   
48 Microfinance Information Exchange. “Microfinance in Honduras.” 2010. 
<www.mixmarket.org> 19 Feb 2010. 
49 Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca and Margaret Sherraden. “Microfinance, Women’s 
Savings, and Financial Security in a Honduran Barrio.” Social Development Issues 29 
(2007): 65-80. p. 68. Social Sciences Full Text Database, 25 Oct 2009. 
50 Berger 22 
! 24 
CHAPTER TWO: THE QUESTION OF EMPOWERMENT 
 
Defining Empowermenta 
 Microfinance institutions worldwide, when advertising the impact of their 
services, continually use the word “empowerment” to specifically describe the positive 
changes that access to credit can bring to women’s lives. But “empowerment” remains an 
ambiguous term that many of these organizations neglect to define. Joy Deshmukh-
Ranadive and Ranjani K. Murthy, in Microcredit, Poverty and Empowerment, define 
empowerment as the process of the achievement of personal agency through the removal 
of economic, psychological, and socio-cultural barriers that were once kept in place by 
formal institutions and social norms. The empowered individual is transformed from a 
“passive recipient” of existing social and economic conditions to an “active participant” 
in the world around her, making individual decisions that give her the power to affect her 
future.1 Economic empowerment, psychological empowerment, and socio-cultural 
empowerment are all concepts that have been individually debated and quantified. 
Economic empowerment may refer to financial independence or the gain of necessary 
funds for health or education expenses, for example. Psychological empowerment 
suggests various possible increases in personal confidence. Socio-cultural empowerment 
can encompass a number of improvements in gender norms, such as the betterment of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
a The empowerment of the client is one of three projected impacts of microfinance on women, as outlined 
by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen in their influential “capability approach” on social justice and 
individual quality of life. Only empowerment and its specific meanings are relevant to our discussion, but 
the other two equally important impacts on the client are capacity building and provisioning. A 
microfinance organization builds the capacities of a client by bringing out her natural human capabilities, 
which may have been previously barred by her poverty and lack of access to resources such as education. 
An organization achieves capacity building through the provision or facilitation of necessary “material and 
social resources” to the client. When she is able to fully exercise her capabilities as an economic 
participant, the female microfinance client can empower herself as a woman. (quoted in Alexander 2) 
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marital equality and bargaining relationships in the household or female community 
organizing.2 Our discussion of empowerment will be broken up by these three factors and 
we will discuss the details of their manifestations further below. Theorists disagree on 
which aspect is most essential, and if all of these aspects or only one of them is necessary 
to fully empower the woman as a microfinance client. I will argue that all three aspects 
must be achieved together in order for an organization to claim that it has fully 
empowered its clients.  
 In any discussion of the empowerment of women by microfinance, there are two 
sources of discrepancy that must be taken into account. The first is whether the specific 
microfinance organization being discussed provides a credit-only model to its clients or a 
credit-plus model with extra financial and social services. Some argue that simple access 
to credit is the only necessary catalyst of empowerment, citing a “virtuous spiral” 
argument which states that the increase in income from a microloan will automatically 
kick-start a number of psychological, social, and cultural improvements in the client’s 
life.3 Other theorists are more skeptical of this virtuous spiral, asserting that credit may 
address practical needs in a client’s life but cannot automatically have a significant effect 
on entrenched social conditions and gender norms. These theorists advocate for the 
credit-plus model as a more feasible catalyst for the empowerment of women, 
highlighting the importance of extra financial services to achieve economic 
empowerment and extra social and educational services to achieve psychological and 
socio-cultural empowerment.4 A second source of discrepancy is the social and economic 
context in which a microfinance organization is operating. Conditions in South Asian 
countries versus Latin American countries, for example, differ significantly in terms of 
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economic structure and gender inequality and oppression. In India, for example, a strong 
socioeconomic caste system exists which constrains individuals to certain poverty levels, 
and social conventions such as the dowry contribute to gender inequalities.5 In Honduras, 
in contrast, an inflated informal sector of the economy makes for saturated markets that 
intensify competition between small businesses, and the cultural notion of machismo 
contributes to the view of women as weak and unintelligent.6 When we examine the 
ability of a particular microfinance organization to empower its female clients, we must 
keep in mind these factors of provided services and national context as essential 
contributors to that institution’s success. 
 
Incidence and Feasibility of Economic Empowerment 
 Throughout previous studies conducted on the empowerment of women through 
microfinance, the primary positive indicators of economic empowerment found have 
been financial independence, the ability to contribute significantly to family income, and 
the increased capacity to pay essential living costs such as health care, food, and 
education. In 2007, Rebecca Vonderlack-Navarro and Margaret Sherraden conducted 
research on economic and social impacts for female clients of the organization Genesis 
Microfinance outside of Tegucigalpa, Honduras. According to their interviews, twenty-
one of the thirty women who lived with a spouse or partner declared that because of their 
microloans they felt financially independent from their husbands for the first time. These 
women were able to make their own purchases in the local market and now worried less 
about money.7 As Naila Kabeer reports in her 2001 account of research conducted in 
Bangladesh with female clients of SEDP, a significant portion of interviewees declared 
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that with their microloans they were able to contribute equally to family income and thus 
had reached equality of economic status with their husbands and other family members.8 
This significant increase in income and economic equality allows many female clients to 
pay important living costs and thus improve the well-being of their families, to which 
Susan Johnson provides an example in “Gender Relations, Empowerment, and 
Microcredit: Moving on from a Lost Decade.” Her study with FINCA in Malawi shows 
that food expenditure and quality of food consumption is significantly higher for the 
families of women who receive microloans than for those who do not.9 From these three 
specific examples of financial independence and equality and improvement of living 
standards, we see women gaining agency as they break down economic barriers. Thus 
these microfinance organizations have effectively helped their female clients to achieve 
economic empowerment. The personal economic effects of microloans remain 
complicated, however, and thus we arrive at our discussion of indicators of economic 
stagnation or disempowerment for female clients of microfinance. 
 The primary indicators of a lack of economic empowerment—or even of 
disempowerment—caused by microfinance are its inability to fully pull the individual out 
of poverty and the excessive control that it exerts over clients through debt. Serena 
Cosgrove, in her study with clients of the Salvadoran Foundation for Integral Support 
(FUSAI), writes that microloans have helped these individuals improve their businesses, 
their incomes, and their standard of living, but do not have the capacity to help them rise 
significantly above the poverty line. Clients of this microfinance organization reflect the 
common trend of relative improvement but a chronic inability to truly advance due to the 
constant necessity of loan repayment. The director of FUSAI himself tells Cosgrove: 
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“Really all we are doing is helping people survive… We are not helping them get out of 
poverty. We are just helping them not to get poorer.”10 Hunt and Kasynathan, in 
“Pathways to Empowerment?”, even cite evidence that the constant debt experienced by 
microfinance clients can set them back financially. Research conducted with BRAC 
clients shows a negative correlation between ownership of assets and length of 
membership with the organization. BRAC clients report that they have needed to sell 
personal assets in order to repay their debts.11 Debt can be an especially risky situation 
for the poor individuals who are clients of microfinance. David Hulme explains that for a 
microfinance client who finds herself in the midst of an economic crisis or natural 
disaster, the repayment of loans becomes nearly impossible because she possesses little 
collateral or savings as a cushion. He asserts that “microdebt” can be more oppressive 
than beneficial for the poor.12 b These arguments on the negative financial aspects of 
microfinance demonstrate to us that its economic effects are not always necessarily 
empowering for the female client. Although female microfinance clients may become 
economically empowered by increased income equality and well-being, the constancy of 
debt may prevent them from further financial advancement and even pull them 





b When criticizing the financial risks of microfinance, we must keep in mind the significant economic 
variables that remain out of the control of a microfinance organization. Most organizations work in 
developing countries where economic crises are frequent and where individual risk in the operation of 
small business is heightened by the saturated nature of informal markets. The poor clients that these 
microfinance organizations serve are especially vulnerable in their management of debt not by the 
organization’s fault, but as a function of their structurally reinforced poverty.  
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Incidence and Feasibility of Psychological Empowerment 
 Previous research on women’s empowerment through microfinance has 
demonstrated indicators of psychological empowerment that the access to credit can 
catalyze: increased confidence, sense of agency, and self-respect. Vonderlack-Navarro 
and Sherraden, in their study on Genesis Microfinance in Honduras, report that the 
majority of their female respondents described an increase in confidence and self-esteem 
since they had become clients of Genesis. One woman expressed that she felt a new sense 
of pride because she finally had money of her own, stating that “I know what I have is 
mine.” These clients also testified that they felt a greater sense of capability to run their 
businesses, and were “more organized and focused” on their daily work.13 Hunt and 
Kasynathan, in their study on BRAC clients in Bangladesh, reported similar results. All 
but one women’s group interviewed by Hunt and Kasynathan expressed that the strongest 
positive change that they had experienced as BRAC clients was an increase in self-
respect and confidence. According to these microfinance clients, they now felt that they 
had “more value” as individuals within their families and surrounding communities. They 
felt more capable to give advice to others and more deserving of respect from their 
peers.14 These increases in confidence are some of the most widely reported positive 
impacts of microfinance on the female client. In many cases reported by studies on 
microfinance clients, it appears clear that the economic empowerment factors of 
increased income and financial independence have a direct effect on psychological 
empowerment through increased self-confidence. 
 The counterargument to such evidence of psychological empowerment lies in the 
reported negative psychological effects on the individual from solidarity group power 
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relations and debt anxiety. Linda Mayoux, through her research with a variety of 
microfinance NGOs in Cameroon, found that those institutions that used a group lending 
model experienced problems with power relations within groups. The poorer and more 
disadvantaged women felt manipulated or pressured at times by the stronger members of 
their solidarity group.15 As well, a client’s financial failure may have a painful 
psychological impact on her as a solidarity group member, as groups often label 
unsuccessful members as irresponsible or unintelligent in the community and thus 
damage their reputation and social standing. In these cases the group model of 
microfinance has proved much less effective than an individual model may have been, as 
it causes psychological stress for certain clients. The pressure of debt creates a second 
negative psychological effect cited by microfinance theorists, who declare that the state 
of being in constant debt can instill fear and anxiety in poor clients and can cause them to 
feel constantly guilty and vulnerable. Thomas Dichter, in “Can microcredit make an 
already slippery slope more slippery?”, asserts that the existence of debt between the 
individual and the microfinance provider immediately creates a psychological 
relationship of power that can be exceedingly stressful or shameful for the client.16 
Hulme writes that this power relationship between institution and client may even be a 
source of perpetual fear for individuals, as they feel anxious about what may happen to 
them and their families if they cannot pay their debt.17 Solidarity group tensions and debt 
anxiety thus represent two sources of psychological detriment that participation in 
microfinance programs can bring upon the client, in clear contradiction with the evidence 
for its psychological empowerment possibilities.  
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Incidence and Feasibility of Socio-cultural Empowerment 
 The idea of socio-cultural empowerment for women as an effect of 
microfinance—essentially, the alleviation of normative gender inequalities in the 
household and the community—is the most hotly contested concept in microfinance 
theory. Whether a micro-lending institution truly has the power to change such deep-set 
social conditions is a constant source of questioning and reexamination. The positive side 
of the debate cites specific evidence from studies on female clients that show 
improvement in marital relations and equality, increased community participation, and 
the empowerment of the next generation of women in families through education. Naila 
Kabeer, in her study on female SEDP clients in Bangladesh, presents detailed evidence of 
the improvement of harmony within marriages and the increase in joint, equal decision-
making between husband and wife. The majority of Kabeer’s interviewees stated that 
since the start of their loans with SEDP, the increased financial prosperity of their 
families had led to a release in tension within marriages and/or an increase in respect 
received from husbands due to the client’s contribution to the family.18 As well, 90% of 
interviewees reported that equality in decision-making between spouses had either 
improved or retained its already positive status.19 Kabeer’s study also demonstrates a 
mitigation of gender inequalities within the community for SEDP clients. Female clients 
were now more likely to purchase land in their name and to travel to the market place, 
both of which have traditionally been male activities.20 Finally, Hunt and Kasynathan 
present evidence for the empowerment of clients’ daughters, and thus the next generation 
of women in the community, through education. They found that girls were more likely 
to be sent to school if their mothers were receiving microloans.21 These three indicators, 
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among a variety of other factors in gender norm alleviation, are constantly looked for in 
studies on microfinance and empowerment. From the examples above it is clear that 
socio-cultural empowerment is indeed possible for women as an effect of microfinance. 
We will now turn to the counterargument, which discusses possible detriments to marital 
relations and the incapacity of microfinance to change social and cultural structure. 
 Critics of microfinance often declare that microfinance organizations project a 
rhetoric of women’s empowerment through the transformation of gender norms that is 
unfounded, and even at times the direct opposite of truth. A common theory states that 
women’s access to credit creates tension in marriages as husbands feel threatened by their 
wives’ new success or begin to pressure their wives into relinquishing the loan money to 
them. These tensions may lead to an increase in domestic violence or the seizure of 
clients’ loans by their husbands. Robin Isserles, in “Microcredit: The Rhetoric of 
Empowerment, the Reality of ‘Development as Usual’”, cites a study conducted with 
Grameen clients in Bangladesh which showed that 57 percent of female clients saw a rise 
in spousal verbal aggression since the start of their loans, and 13 percent a rise in both 
verbal and physical violence.22 Ann Marie Goetz and Rina Sen Gupta, in their widely 
cited 1996 study with a variety of microfinance organizations in Bangladesh, report that 
63% of female clients interviewed showed partial to no control over their own 
microloans, which in most cases had passed into the hands of their husbands.23 In these 
examples, the provision of microloans to women in fact worsened the gender dynamics 
within their households. Other theorists simply state that a small loan does not have the 
capacity to reverse long-standing socio-cultural conditions, and that only credit-plus 
models of microfinance can hope to make even incremental changes towards gender 
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equality for microfinance clients. Linda Mayoux, in her research in Cameroon, found that 
female clients had not significantly challenged the gender inequality that they 
experienced in the home or in the community, although the organization asserted that 
such changes would take place.24 Mayoux, like many skeptical microfinance theorists, 
advocates strongly for a “credit-plus” model of microfinance that specifically provides 
social and educational services aimed at alleviating gender inequalities. She writes that 
measures such as “awareness training in gender issues for men and women” and 
“provision of services to decrease reproductive work to give women more time for 
income-earning and for wider social and political activities” are necessary steps that any 
microfinance organization must take if it hopes to fully empower its female clients.25 The 
debate over socio-cultural empowerment remains at a gridlock between clear evidence on 
both sides. One fact remains true in this continual discussion: if microfinance 
organizations are to claim female empowerment and the alleviation of gender inequalities 
as impacts of their services on the individual, they must take specific measures to provide 
concrete and lasting results for their clients. 
 These economic, psychological, and socio-cultural factors in the empowerment of 
women must hold equal weight in our discussion of microfinance and in the mission of 
microfinance organizations that truly aim to change the lives of their female clients. A 
simple increase in income does not automatically make an empowered woman, and it is 
with this knowledge that we continue to research and investigate the feasibility and 
strategic possibilities of empowerment through microfinance. I add the results from my 
recent work in Honduras with the microfinance organization FINCA to this constantly 
developing pool of investigations and literature. From my research I have come to my 
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own conclusions on this debate over women, microfinance, and empowerment within the 
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CHAPTER THREE: HONDURAN CONTEXT 
 
Honduras Overview 
 The research that will be presented in this thesis was conducted in 2009 in the 
republic of Honduras. Honduras is located in Central America, bordering Guatemala to 
the northwest and El Salvador and Nicaragua to the southwest and southeast, 
respectively. Honduras is roughly the size of the state of Tennessee, measuring 43,277 
square miles. The Honduran climate is temperate in the mountainous inland regions and 
tropical in the coastal lowlands. The population as last recorded in 2008 was 7,241,503, 
with approximately twenty percent of Hondurans living in the two major cities, the 
central capital of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula in the north.  
Honduras varies significantly from neighbors such as Guatemala in its high ethnic 
homogeneity—about ninety percent of Hondurans are mestizo (mixed indigenous and 
European) with seven percent of the population as indigenous, two percent black, and one 
percent white. This homogeneity contributes significantly to linguistic unity within the 
country—the national language is Spanish with almost no representation of other 
indigenous languages. Religious affiliation is also highly consistent nationwide, as eighty 
percent of Hondurans identify as Roman Catholic, with the remaining portion of the 
population belonging to various Protestant denominations. 
 Honduras’ Human Development Index value is 0.714, which ranks it 117th out of 
the 194 nations in the world and clearly places it in the “third world” category of 
development and living standards. The infant mortality rate in Honduras is 27 per every 
1,000 births. Life expectancy according to 2006 estimates is 67.1 years for men and 72.8 
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years for women. It is critical to understand the origins of Honduras’ extremely low 
standard of living, which makes it an essential climate for microfinance. The continual 
underdeveloped status that Honduras suffers has been catalyzed and perpetuated by its 
difficult political, economic, and social history, which we will now cover.1 2 3 
 
Political History and Current Status 
 Honduras achieved independence from Spain in 1821 as a member of the Central 
American Federation of states, and became its own sovereign nation in 1839.4 Honduras 
has seen long periods of military rule since 1839 and its political history has been 
characterized by dictatorships and frequent military coups. Successive government 
overthrows have been catalyzed primarily by ongoing conflict between the two major 
political parties—the conservative Partido Nacional (PN) and the liberal Partido Liberal 
(PL). For example, in 1954 PL candidate José Villeda was elected president, but was 
soon overthrown in 1956 by his PR opponent Julio Lozano with the support of a military 
junta. The military then held elections in 1957 and Villeda was re-elected as Honduran 
president. General Oswaldo López, Minister of Defense, subsequently toppled Villeda in 
1963 and was officially elected in 1965, running on the platform of a new constitution.5 
Clashes continued in this manner until 1981, when general elections were successfully 
held and Partido Liberal candidate Roberto Suazo gained an absolute majority. Although 
the government technically lay in civilian hands at this time, ties between military and 
state remained tightly knit. For many years, disappearances of social activists and human 
rights abuses were frequently carried out at the hands of the military. 6 Finally, in 1999 
constitutional amendments were passed that significantly reduced the power of military 
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juntas and separated military officers from executive positions.7 But Honduras has not 
fully cured itself of political fluctuation and military influence, as we will discuss below. 
High political instability and harsh dictatorial rule over the Honduran population are 
elemental factors that have undermined its people’s freedoms and stunted its growth. 
 The Honduran government is today characterized as a democratic Republic and 
its structure consists of three major branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. The 
executive branch includes the president and cabinets. The National Congress is the sole 
actor in the legislative branch, to which deputies are elected from each of the 18 regional 
departments. The judiciary branch is comprised of the nine-member Supreme Court and 
the Courts of Appeal. Honduras’ constitution was last revised in 1995, and upholds a 
number of basic citizen rights such as freedom of speech and religion, the right to habeas 
corpus, and the right to equal pay for equal work. The death penalty and abortion are both 
outlawed in Honduras. The Honduran government grants universal suffrage to all citizens 
over the age of 18, and a new president is elected every four years by popular vote. 8 Due 
to various reforms, the election process and other government operations and programs 
have increasingly included Honduran women in recent years. 
 Honduras was the final country in Latin America to grant suffrage to women and 
has only recently begun to outline specific government programs that support women. 
Honduran women secured the right to vote in 1955. Honduras still has not had a female 
president, but women have held important offices such as vice president and mayor and 
in 2001 they obtained 9.4 percent of the seats in the National Congress. In 1997, PN 
candidate Nora Gunera was the first female to run for president in Honduras. Honduras 
has also recently responded to United Nations pressure to reduce gender inequalities and 
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created a National Policy for Women in 1989, after the first UN Decade for Women. This 
policy aimed to provide economic support for women and equality in specific 
employment sectors and environmental policy, for example. The concrete effects of such 
legislative assistance for women remain to be proved in Honduras.9 
 In June 2009, a political crisis occurred in Honduras that has triggered profound 
losses in governmental legitimacy and national welfare. President Manuel Zelaya, elected 
in 2005 as a member of the Partido Liberal, was removed by military coup from office 
and exiled to Costa Rica on the 28th of June. Zelaya had proposed a constitutional 
amendment that would remove the one-term limit to presidential service and make 
indefinite presidency a looming possibility, and had ignored significant resistance to the 
referendum from his National Congress and advisors. The Congress subsequently 
directed the military to overthrow Zelaya by force, and replaced him with the president of 
Congress, Roberto Micheletti.10 Relative stability was finally reached again in Honduras 
in January 2010, when newly elected president Porfirio Lobo took office,11 but the nation 
had already felt extreme detriments to its international relations and economic well-being. 
While Micheletti held the presidency, he significantly undermined civil liberties and 
many Hondurans were not permitted to leave their homes for days or to practice freedom 
of speech.12 The international community responded overwhelmingly negatively to the 
undemocratic transition of power from Zelaya to Micheletti. The Organization of 
American States (OAS) suspended Honduras from membership for a period of time, and 
the United States discontinued thirty million dollars in military and economic aid to the 
small nation. Many countries cut off all trade with Honduras during Micheletti’s time in 
office, and some have still refused to recognize the legitimacy of Lobo’s election.13 
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Honduras’ economy, which was already on a downward spiral as a result of the global 
economic crisis, has seen an unprecedented failure in the nine months since the coup—
tourism revenues, for example, have dropped over 70 percent.14 The economic downturn 
felt in Honduras has been especially difficult for the poor, thus making microfinance a 
difficult industry to sustain. These effects will be evident in my survey results, which 
come from the direct aftermath of Honduras’ political crisis.  
  
Economic History and Current Status 
  Honduras is a nation that has continually endured extreme poverty. Its GDP per 
capita ranks the third lowest in all of Latin America, at $4,200 as estimated in 2009.15 
Equally revealing is the fact that approximately 64 percent of the Honduran population 
lives below the poverty line, and even more Hondurans live in relative poverty.16 A very 
small portion of the Honduran population truly possesses the finances and resources to 
live in comfort. The Honduran national income gap is exceptionally wide: the richest 
twenty percent of Hondurans control 61.8 percent of the country’s wealth, while the 
poorest twenty percent owns only 1.6 percent of national wealth.17 In the world economy, 
Honduras remains highly vulnerable, ranking 113th worldwide in external debt with 
$3.315 billion dollars owed internationally.18 Honduras’ poverty and wealth gap has been 
linked to political instability and corrupt leadership throughout its history—
embezzlement and lack of government support have been common phenomena, 
especially during the decades of military rule discussed above.19 Its underdevelopment 
has also been clearly induced by dependent trade relationships and exploitative ties to 
international economic institutions. 
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 Honduras’ narrow and foreign-controlled banana and coffee industries historically 
made it the classic “banana republic” throughout the twentieth century, until recent 
decades when it moved towards market diversification and complete trade liberalization, 
which have brought new forms of foreign exploitation to the country. Throughout the 
twentieth century large corporations such as Chiquita and Dole managed the production 
and export of bananas in Honduras, and the small nation was unable to develop its own 
elite experts in the economic sector. Much of national revenues from banana and coffee 
production were lost to foreign hands.20 In the 1990s, Honduras finally began to diversify 
its economy by developing its shrimp and melon industries, for example, and reduced its 
complete dependence on large corporations. In the new millennium it adopted free trade 
policies under pressure from the United States and international organizations such as the 
IMF and the World Bank. In 2000 Honduras was granted NAFTA parity—the same 
access to American markets and trade liberalization as NAFTA members.21 In 2006 it 
formed the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with surrounding 
nations.22 The effects of free trade in Honduras have been mixed, as in many 
impoverished and vulnerable countries. Free trade has brought unprecedented Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) to Honduras, which has allowed for the same foreign control of 
its economy as once existed through domination by Chiquita and Dole. Maquiladoras—
large factories run by foreign corporations that remain exempt from government taxes—
have become significant sources of employment but have extracted the vast majority of 
their revenue from Honduras and have neglected the basic rights of their workers.23 
Honduras remains a nation frequently exploited by more powerful economic actors and 
has historically failed to retain supervision of its own industries and workers. 
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 The labor force in Honduras is primarily concentrated in low-paying agriculture 
and industrial jobs and in services such as small businesses.24 Employment in agriculture 
has fallen significantly since the 1980s, as Honduras has seen a strong trend of rural-
urban migration. Coffee farming, for example, has become more competitive and 
commercialized and less lucrative for the common farmer. Growing numbers of 
Hondurans have attempted to make a living through micro-businesses such as tortilla 
stands or small convenient stores in urban areas, thus making the presence of 
microfinance institutions increasingly essential in the country.25 For women, formal 
employment is most available in the “feminized” sectors of the economy—maquiladora 
manufacturing or domestic service. Honduran women, when involved in agriculture, take 
part in the harvesting and packing of bananas and coffee. Nationwide, the average formal 
woman’s salary is only thirty-five percent of the average man’s salary. But the vast 
majority of Honduran women work in the informal sector as micro-entrepreneurs or in 
subsistence agriculture.26 They are often too poor to register their businesses with the 
government, and therefore are not included in official economic statistics—but 
Honduras’ enormous informal sector plays a key supportive role in its economy and 
Honduran women are therefore important economic actors. These women who manage 
small enterprises in the informal sector are those who the Honduran microfinance 
industry seeks to serve. 
 In October 1998, Honduras’ economy and infrastructure was completely 
devastated by the catastrophic Hurricane Mitch, and the nation’s economic structure and 
policies have been dominated by debt ever since. The hurricane destroyed Honduras’ 
agricultural industry, ruining seventy percent of banana crops and twenty percent of 
! 44 
coffee crops among other losses. An estimate seven thousand Hondurans were killed by 
Hurricane Mitch, and 1.5 million were left homeless. Mudslides and flooding leveled five 
thousand telephone lines and over half of the country’s roads, making communication 
essentially impossible throughout Honduras. The economic damage caused by Hurricane 
Mitch came to a startling five billion dollars—95 percent of the country’s GDP in 1998. 
The nation was plunged into extreme debt and in 1999 came to a relief agreement with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In exchange for one billion dollars of debt relief, 
Honduras was required to restructure its economy according to IMF structural adjustment 
program standards, which included widespread privatization, social security reforms, and 
improved health care programs. Structural adjustment has thus brought certain benefits to 
Honduras but has placed it in a position of constant dependence on foreign aid. 
Honduras’ economy remains weak and underdeveloped today, and the nation’s poverty is 
only one of many crippling effects on the progress and prosperity of Honduran women. 
 
Social Norms: The Continual Subordination of Women 
 Honduran gender norms have historically granted men and women drastically 
different social standing, defining their value as individuals according to opposite social 
spheres and granting men the ultimate social, physical, and psychological power. 
Machismo, the common Latin American system of cultural norms surrounding male 
superiority, places Honduran men in the breadwinning role while requiring them 
essentially no responsibility in the home. Male infidelity and desertion are common 
phenomena that are normalized in Honduran culture. Domestic violence is also 
widespread in Honduran homes. Meanwhile, female social norms are informed by 
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marianismo, the counterpart to machismo in Honduran culture. Marianismo is based on 
the ideal of the Virgin Mary as the perfect mother and woman, and therefore places 
women on a pedestal solely in the sphere of the home.27 Julie Cupples explains this 
dichotomy between marianismo and machismo: “Marianismo is based on notions of self-
sacrificing motherhood, and consequently motherhood is elevated to a high status. The 
coexistence of marianismo and machismo means that paradoxically, while women are 
respected as mothers, they are degraded as women.”28 For Honduran women, these 
limiting gender norms make the achievement of influence in the community or success in 
business, for example, especially difficult. Microfinance’s specific focus on women is 
therefore a necessary policy in Honduras, as it attempts to ease the normative exclusion 
of women. 
 Early pregnancy and single motherhood are common occurrences for Honduran 
women that make the support of a family in impoverished conditions especially 
complicated. In Honduras, machismo and male sexual authority contributes to an 
“extreme cultural resistance to the use of condoms.” Consequently, teen pregnancy rates 
are high in Honduras, and such pregnancies rarely result in marriage of mother and 
father. Informal cohabitation, called union libre, or free union, is popular in Honduras 
among poor families because of the money and legal paperwork required for official 
marriage. Free unions, however, are much more likely to result in male desertion and 
single motherhood, and an estimated fifty percent of Honduran households today are 
headed by single mothers. Single Honduran mothers are especially economically 
vulnerable because of the lack of a second income in their households. Therefore we will 
find that single mothers make up a significant portion of microfinance clients in 
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Honduras, as they seek extra assistance in supporting their families with one small 
enterprise.29 
 Domestic violence is a widespread and often normalized form of oppression 
against women in Honduras. A study by the UN Population Fund stated that 
approximately eighty percent of Honduran women will experience domestic violence in 
their lifetimes. In 1996, the Honduran city of Comayagua reported that sixty percent of 
all police cases in that year had been due to domestic violence. Cupples writes, “the main 
causes of domestic violence are seen to lie in cultural understandings of male dominance, 
alcoholism, and the tendency to see domestic violence as a private problem rather than a 
social or human rights issue.” Thus Honduran women have historically felt obligated to 
quietly endure domestic violence instead of speaking out for their rights. Thankfully, 
since 1998 specific legislature has been passed in the Honduran National Congress that 
has made it easier for women to report domestic violence cases and has funded support 
programs for battered women. No actual reduction in domestic violence incidence has 
been proved, however. Honduran women continue to face significant obstacles in the 
community and the home that bar them from gaining equal social standing and respect.30 
In response to these obstacles of sexist social norms, frequent single motherhood, and 
domestic violence, microfinance has been employed in nations such as Honduras as a tool 
to attempt to empower women and combat the gender inequalities that they face. 
 The perpetually difficult political, economic, and social conditions in Honduras 
have brought instability, poverty, and inequality to its women since the nation’s birth. 
Hondurans have seen years of corrupt and dictatorial politics, economic exploitation and 
crisis, and stark gender inequalities that have made survival as a poor Honduran woman 
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even more of a struggle. Microfinance has therefore been viewed as a necessary 
development tool and alleviator of inequality in Honduras. The female microfinance 
clients whose stories and statistics we will consider—all served by the non-profit 
microfinance organization FINCA Honduras —present strong examples of the daily 
hardships that Honduran women face and of the possibilities to improve their lives and 
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINCA HONDURAS AND SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
 
FINCA Honduras 
The research that will be presented in this thesis was carried out solely with 
clients of FINCA Honduras. FINCA Honduras is a branch of FINCA International, a 
non-profit microfinance organization that works “to provide financial services to the 
world’s lowest-income entrepreneurs so they can create jobs, build assets, and improve 
their standard of living.”1 FINCA was founded in 1984 by John Hatch and gave its first 
small loan in El Salvador. Since then, it has grown to provide its services to the poor in 
22 countries worldwide in Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. 
FINCA Honduras began in 1989 and works to serve clients from 12 offices across the 
country. In each office work about fifteen employees, with a branch director, credit 
supervisors, and client officers. Branch directors and credit supervisors maintain the 
organization of budgets, client officers’ schedules, services to clients, and all other daily 
activity of the office. The client officers act as liaisons between the organization and its 
clients. They spend each day in the field attending group meetings and visiting clients 
individually to complete loan distribution and repayments and to monitor and provide 
support for the progress of each client’s project. These are the FINCA employees who 
truly make the individual transformative work of the organization possible.  
FINCA Honduras is a non-profit microfinance organization that provides group 
loans primarily to women. FINCA clients take out small loans primarily in groups called 
“village banks” in which they support each other in growing their businesses. Village 
banks are made up of about ten members on average. Each village bank elects a directive 
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board that holds the responsibility of managing the collective loans of the group and 
group savings, among other tasks. 70 percent of FINCA’s clients worldwide are women, 
and in Honduras they make up 80 percent. FINCA demonstrates a clear mission to focus 
on women, in accordance with theories on the extended benefits of lending to women and 
on possibilities for their empowerment.2 As women are especially disadvantaged and 
poor in Honduras, this focus is an essential part of FINCA’s mission as a Honduran 
microfinance organization.  
FINCA Honduras tends to serve the relative poor as its client base and provides 
additional “credit plus” services to its clients. The average loan taken out by a FINCA 
Honduras client is $611 in United States dollars.3  This is an impressive average 
considering Honduras’ income statistics: the estimated per capita income in Honduras is 
$1,190, and almost half of Hondurans live on less than two US dollars a day.4 Such a 
comparison between Honduran poverty standards and the loan capacity of FINCA 
Honduras’ average client proves that this microfinance organization serves the relative 
poor instead of the most poor in Honduras. Those Hondurans who are able to access 
FINCA’s services benefit from its “credit plus” model, which provides savings practice 
and an emerging health insurance program. A monthly savings deposit into the village 
bank’s communal fund is required of all clients, and this money is used in case of 
emergency or taken out for specific needs as voiced by group members and approved by 
their associates. Starting in 2009, FINCA Honduras also began to provide health 
insurance to its clients—all clients are required to make a small monthly deposit towards 
health insurance in addition to their savings, and in exchange they are guaranteed full 
coverage of any hospital expenses or large medical bills when health emergencies arise in 
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their families. The obligatory nature of these two services is controversial, as it may 
simply add an extra economic burden to certain clients already struggling to pay back 
their FINCA loans on time. FINCA Honduras has seen these additional client services as 
a sign of progress for the organization, however, and continues to promote the “credit 
plus” model of microfinance as the best way to reach its moderately poor clients. c  
 
Interning with FINCA 
 From June 1st to August 1st, 2009, I worked as an intern with FINCA Honduras. 
Seeking to study women and social change through microfinance, I secured an internship 
with FINCA Honduras and was given a specific assignment by the research branch of 
FINCA International. FINCA International sends representatives to its various affiliates 
worldwide to conduct a standardized survey with clients called the FINCA Client 
Assessment Tool (FCAT). The FCAT aims to “capture a detailed picture of the standard 
of living of clients” and to “provide useful information for the development of products 
and services.”5 I was given an abridged version of the FCAT to conduct with FINCA 
clients in Honduras, which solely focused on specific standard of living indicators. My 
job as an intern consisted of traveling between four different cities to carry out this 
survey in person with clients. 
 FINCA Honduras directs local branches in eight small cities throughout the 
country aside from the main FINCA headquarters in the capitol, Tegucigalpa. I spent my !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
c Microfinance organizations, in their implementation of the “credit-plus” model, often encounter a conflict 
between providing extra financial services to the client and increasing the possible financial burden on the 
client. The logical way to fund additional services such as health insurance is through the increase of 
interest rates on client loans, and “credit-plus” microfinance organizations can often only remain 
financially stable by placing this greater burden on the client. Therefore it is difficult to draw the line 
between the limitations of providing simple credit to the client and the pitfalls of raising interest rates in 
order to fund additional services. 
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internship conducting the FINCA survey in the cities of Copán, Progreso, Choluteca, and 
Danlí, and I spent approximately two weeks in each location. These cities were chosen 
specifically because they are well distributed geographically throughout Honduras, and 
thus the results of my survey with FINCA clients from these different locations would be 
most generalizable and reliable. From 8 AM to 5 PM each weekday and from 8 AM to 12 
PM on Saturdays, I traveled out to different neighborhoods and villages with one client 
officer per day. I followed him or her visiting clients and participating in village bank 
meetings, and conducted the FINCA survey with those that we visited.  
My aim to collect survey results from ten clients per day was often not 
accomplished, due to misunderstanding and/or disorganization at the local branch level of 
FINCA Honduras and more importantly, due to complications of the military coup that 
occurred in the first month of my internship. I was in Progreso on the day of the coup, 
June 28, 2009, and from that day onwards my results in Progreso were scarce due to 
curfews that barred travel outside city borders and general insecurity in the streets. My 
results in Danlí were also essentially nonexistent—only six interviews—because I was 
staying there when the ousted president Zelaya attempted to enter the country twenty 
minutes away at the border with Nicaragua. The city of Danlí was put on twenty-four 
hour curfew for five days, and thus FINCA was unable to open its office and visits to 
clients were cancelled. Nevertheless, I completed 170 interviews with FINCA clients 
between the four Honduran cities of Copán, Progreso, Choluteca, and Danlí by the close 
of my internship. The size and consistency of my aggregate sample of interviewees was 
compromised by the named setbacks, as I conducted the majority of my interviews in 
Copán and Choluteca and thus skewed the geographical generalizability of the survey. 
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However, I followed specific FINCA guidelines to conduct this survey in the most 
reliable and organized way possible, which I will outline below. 
 
The FINCA Survey 
 The condensed version of the FCAT that I used during my internship consisted of 
twenty-seven official FINCA survey questions, measuring a variety of indicators of 
clients’ “Wealth, Health, Education, Empowerment, and Living standards.”6 From this 
title the survey was referred to as the WHEEL. The WHEEL originally only contained 
sixteen questions, but I was given the opportunity to choose other questions from the full 
FCAT survey that interested me, and to expand the WHEEL by adding them to the end of 
the survey. Although I could not form questions of my own, I was able to elaborate on a 
number of the more closed or quantitative questions so as to gain more detail and 
qualitative input from the client being interviewed. With these extra questions I was able 
to increase the validity of my survey, as I could measure more closely what I originally 
intended to study—the specific impact of FINCA’s services on the economic, 
psychological, and socio-cultural empowerment of women. For example, following the 
question “How would you rate your health at this time?” which gave interviewees five 
response options on a scale from “excellent” to “very poor”, I asked clients if their 
response to this question would have been different before they started their loans with 
FINCA. I probed for details on changes in clients’ health over time since they had 
become FINCA clients and on FINCA’s role in their wellbeing. Although I did not need 
to report this extra information to FINCA, I recorded it for my own investigation and thus 
was able to garner a variety of quantitative and qualitative data from my interviews. 
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 Each official FINCA survey question, whether quantitative or qualitative, was 
made quantifiable by either a numerical answer or a defined set of possible responses. 
Quantitative questions focused mainly on family size and education, family expenses in a 
variety of areas, and specific characteristics of the client’s loan. For example, I asked 
“How many school-aged children live in your home?”, “How much does your household 
usually spend per week on transportation costs?”, and “What is the current length of your 
loan cycle in months?” All of these questions required simple numerical answers. 
Qualitative questions focused primarily on sanitation, health, confidence and happiness, 
food security, and satisfaction with FINCA. All of these qualitative questions offered 
defined possible responses for clients to choose from, but some of the questions offered 
continuous responses while others were categorical. For example, the question “In 
general, how satisfied are you with your life?” can be characterized as continuous, 
because it asks for an answer on a scale from 1-10, with 1 as very unsatisfied and 10 as 
very satisfied. Thus an average could be taken of the responses and the numerical value 
of the chosen option specifically reflected the client’s response. The question on change 
in client health, however, was categorical. It asked, “Has your health or the health of your 
family changed since the start of your loans with FINCA?” and gave three options for the 
interviewee to choose from: 1) “yes, positive change”, 2) “yes, negative change”, or 3) 
“no change”. These options did not have any clear relation to their numerical value, and 
an average of the responses would not have any meaning. These important distinctions 
between question types will come into play in my analysis of the aggregate survey data. 
 To maintain the reliability of this survey, clients were chosen by random sample 
for generalizability and interviews were conducted using palm pilot technology for 
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reproducibility. Before going out into the field with a coworker, I would obtain the list of 
the clients to be visited and randomly choose the order of interviews with a 
randomization program in Excel on my computer. This randomization process was at 
times compromised by disorganization or misunderstanding with clients, and in these 
situations I would randomly choose clients for interviews by opening to a random page in 
the client officer’s booklet, as each client was represented by his or her own client 
information page. To conduct the survey, I was given a palm pilot by FINCA 
International in which I entered all client responses, using a special Pendragon software 
program that contained all of the survey questions and possible answers. Each client’s 
full interview was saved in its own file within the palm pilot, and then transferred to an 
aggregate Excel file on my laptop that organized all interviews into one data set. When I 
completed my internship, I had all of my survey data in one Excel file on my computer 
that could later be analyzed using specific SPSS software. I also carried a notebook and 
pen with me at all times, and recorded clients’ explanations of their answers and their 
responses to my elaborative questions on factors such as health and confidence. The palm 
pilot data set and my written recordings of client quotes together make the whole of my 
collected data from the FINCA survey.  
With these twenty-seven questions and elaborations on client responses, I was 
able to measure many of the indicators that interested me in my research on women, 
microfinance, and empowerment. The vast majority of my interviewees were women—
151 out of 170 total clients interviewed. I was able to gain information on economic 
empowerment through the questions on family expenses, health, and satisfaction with 
one’s loan, for example. I was able to gain feedback on psychological empowerment 
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through questions on confidence and happiness. Finally, I gained some information on 
the clients’ socio-cultural empowerment with the question “Are you the head of your 
household?” and clients’ subsequent explanations of their family dynamics. However, I 
would have liked to ask more questions on gender relations in the home and/or female 
participation the community through politics and other mediums. I was not given this 
option because of my requirement to adhere to official FINCA survey content. The 
FINCA survey was inadequate in a variety of ways to measure the indicators of 
empowerment that I sought to investigate with female clients. Thus my study does not 
cover all of the material that I originally hoped to explore, but it does provide a 
substantial base of data that I have utilized to analyze FINCA’s ability to empower its 
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS 
 The following data analysis is based on an aggregation of survey data from 151 of 
the 170 interviews that I conducted with FINCA Honduras clients in June and July 
2009—the interviews of those 151 clients who were women. The twenty-seven questions 
of the FCAT survey and their respective elaborations have yielded specific indicators on 
the economic, psychological, and socio-cultural empowerment (or lack thereof) of the 
clients interviewed. Survey questions on general client information such as education 
level and civil status have allowed me to analyze other possible sources aside from credit 
with FINCA of positive or negative factors in clients’ lives. I will present the results of 
the survey data for these 151 interviews by category of empowerment: economic, 
psychological and socio-cultural. This data has been analyzed for correlations, means, 
and for equality of means by ANOVA test. I will also present a number of qualitative and 
descriptive comments from interviewees to provide extra detail to the statistical survey 
results. As I review the results of the survey and their implications, I will highlight my 
original hypotheses on specific indicators and the importance of their success or failure. 
 
FINCA and Economic Empowerment 
 The indicators of economic empowerment that emerge from this FCAT survey 
data are divided into five categories: family expenses, food security, health, education of 
children, and financial satisfaction with FINCA. I have formed these categories based on 
specific questions or groups of questions within the survey that address the economic 
empowerment of clients. Each question has been analyzed for a correlation with the 
client’s time with FINCA Honduras, for comparisons of response percentages between 
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“new”, “middle”, and “old” clients, and/or for equality of response means between 
“new”, “middle”, and “old” clients. (“New” clients have spent less than one year with the 
organization, “middle” clients have spent one to four years with FINCA, and “old” 
clients have spent four or more years with FINCA.) A correlation between two variables 
shows a relationship or lack thereof between the two variables. In this case, if the variable 
of client time with FINCA shows a positive correlation with a certain variable such as 
client health, I claim that FINCA has demonstrated a positive impact on clients in that 
area over time. In order for a correlation to be significant, its significance value must be 
less than or equal to 0.05. Basic comparisons of response percentages between new, 
middle, and old clients are used for categorical variables—those variables whose 
responses cannot be analyzed through numerical means. ANOVA tests for equality of 
means are used for continual variables—the ANOVA demonstrates whether the response 
means between new, middle, and old clients show a significant difference and thus if they 
show improvement or deterioration over time. All of these analyses are intended to 
indicate if receiving microloans from FINCA has improved clients’ lives economically 
over time. These time analyses have been my primary measurement of FINCA’s success 
in empowering its clients. Before administering the survey, I originally hypothesized that 
clients who had been with FINCA for more time would show increased spending on 
family expenses, improved food security and health, increased frequency of children in 
school, and higher satisfaction with the organization. 
 Our first indicator of economic empowerment is the category of family expenses. 
Family expenses as measured by this survey are not a perfect measure of client economic 
well-being or empowerment over time: first, the survey only covers seven categories that 
! 60 
clients spend money on, and thus may leave out important areas of spending in clients’ 
lives. Second, because this survey does not have a control group, we cannot claim with 
certainty that any differences in economic well-being between new and old clients are 
due to FINCA’s impact. Finally, our analysis of these family expenses variables simply 
compares new, middle, and old clients instead of measuring the expenses of the same 
clients over time. Thus we cannot claim with certainty that differences between these 
client categories show “improvement over time”, because the same clients are not being 
measured. These second and third limitations will also apply to all of our subsequent 
variables for economic, psychological, and socio-cultural empowerment. 
Economic empowerment as indicated by family expenses has been measured by 
seven FCAT survey questions on specific expenses of the client’s family: weekly food 
expenses, weekly transportation expenses, monthly utility expenses, monthly phone 
expenses, yearly home maintenance expenses, yearly clothing expenses, and yearly 
education expenses. Most relevant is an eighth indicator that I calculated on client family 
expenses, by combining these seven indicators to arrive at the value of a family’s daily 
expenses per capita. (We could also state that this indicator measures “how much money 
the client lives on per day”.) This one value, correlated with a client’s number of loan 
cycles with FINCA (a basic indicator of her time with the organization), can demonstrate 
if clients have been able to spend more money on family standard of living as a result of 
the support of their FINCA loans. Increased standard of living in the client’s family, if 
found among these female FINCA Honduras clients, could demonstrate one facet of 
economic empowerment as discussed by microfinance theorists. Figure 1 presents this 
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correlation along with each specific family expense indicator as correlated with the 
client’s time with FINCA. 
FIGURE 1- Correlations: Time with FINCA and Family expenses 
  Number of loan cycles with FINCA 
Pearson Correlation 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed)  
Number of loan cycles 
with FINCA 
N 151.000 
Pearson Correlation .025 
Sig. (2-tailed) .763 
Weekly food expenses 
N 149 
Pearson Correlation .032 




Pearson Correlation .260** 





Pearson Correlation .050 





Pearson Correlation -.036 




Pearson Correlation -.111 




Pearson Correlation -.066 




Pearson Correlation .009 
Sig. (2-tailed) .923 
Daily family per capita 
expenses in dollars 
N 125 
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Figure 1 presents our relevant findings on FINCA’s effects on client family expenses. 
Contrary to my hypothesis, daily family per capita expenses and the client’s number of 
loan cycles with FINCA show no correlation—in fact, the correlation is so insignificant 
that its significance value is .923. None of the other individual expenses show significant 
correlations with client time with FINCA aside from monthly utility expenses, whose 
significance on its own means very little to our study. Clearly, credit with FINCA did not 
help these female clients of FINCA Honduras to improve their ability to invest in their 
family’s standard of living.  
Interestingly, a second analysis for correlations between the client’s education 
level and her family’s daily per capita expenses showed notable results: those clients who 
had achieved higher education reported higher daily expenses per capita in their families. 
The value for daily family per capita expenses has been converted into American dollars 
for better common understanding of a family’s living standards. Figure 2 shows a three-
way analysis between the variables of educational level, time with FINCA, and daily per 
capita expenses. Daily per capita expenses is analyzed as a dependent variable of the 
other two variables. As we examine the total means (in bold) for each level of education 
reached by these female clients, we can observe a general trend of improvement in daily 
family per capita expenses as level of education rises. (The outlier values for “no 
schooling” and “secondary school incomplete” can be considered relatively negligible 
because the number of interviewees reporting in these two categories was very small (9 
women and 2 women, respectively).) Thus we can claim that the amount of money that a 
client’s family lives on per day depends on her education level.  
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When we examine the smaller differences between new, middle, and old clients in 
Figure 2, we find that FINCA does not empower its clients to improve their daily family 
per capita expenses over time in the context of client education level. I originally 
hypothesized that those clients within the higher education levels would show more 
marked increases in per capita expenses—that FINCA’s ability to economically empower 
its female clients through this indicator of daily family per capita expenses would be 
stronger for those clients who already possessed a high education level. However, only 
the categories of “primary school incomplete” and “secondary school complete” 
demonstrate steady increases in per capita expenses from new to middle to old clients. 
All other categories show no clear positive or negative progression of response means to 
this question on daily family per capita expenses, and thus no significance exists for a 
relationship between time with FINCA and improved family expenses over time within 












FIGURE 2- Comparison: Per Capita in Dollars, Education, Time with FINCA 
Per capita in dollars     
Level of education reached 
New/old 
with 
FINCA Mean N Std. Deviation 
New 2.7024 2 1.43676 
Middle 3.9177 5 5.52293 
Old 2.3656 2 1.65464 
No schooling 
Total 3.3027 9 4.04940 
New 1.2608 15 .55289 
Middle 2.1670 19 2.16618 
Old 2.5430 12 1.62692 
Primary school incomplete 
Total 1.9696 46 1.70019 
New 2.6931 13 2.77574 
Middle 2.4188 21 1.32346 
Old 2.3563 10 .87097 
Primary school complete 
Total 2.4857 44 1.77276 
New 4.8091 1 . 
Middle 3.0063 1 . 
Secondary school 
incomplete 
Total 3.9077 2 1.27482 
New 2.1579 8 1.15577 
Middle 2.1818 5 .86087 
Old 4.7511 3 2.30818 
Secondary school complete 
Total 2.6516 16 1.61755 
New 3.2586 2 1.63979 
Middle 6.8019 3 1.69563 
Old 3.3385 3 1.89708 
Vocational school 
Total 4.6173 8 2.34682 
New 2.1443 41 1.84847 
Middle 2.7014 54 2.44411 
Old 2.7693 30 1.57496 
Total 
Total 2.5350 125 2.07639 
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The above improvements in spending on family standard of living, dependent on the 
client’s education level rather than on client time with FINCA, further demonstrate the 
insignificance of FINCA’s empowerment impact on its female clients in this area. Taking 
out microloans with FINCA has made little significant difference in these women’s 
ability to meet important expenses for their family’s well being. Instead, it is their 
education level that has seemingly predetermined the amount of money on which their 
families live per day. Thus the power of basic societal realities—such as the fact that 
better educated people possess higher capacity to earn and spend money—are not so 
easily changeable in Honduras by this new and popular poverty-fighting strategy of 
microfinance. Despite the rhetoric of social change and empowerment for women behind 
microfinance, it is clear that empowering women to rise above the constraints of their 
education levels is more difficult than it may seem. 
 The next indicator of economic empowerment that we turn to is food security. 
The results for this indicator are based on responses to the question, “Which of the 
following options best describes the food bought and consumed in your home in the past 
year?” and to an elaborative question that I administered, which asked whether the 
client’s food security had changed since the start of her loans with FINCA. The following 







FIGURE 3- Food security frequencies 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
We always eat what we want 62 41.1 41.3 41.3 
We have food but not always 
the kinds of food that we 
would like 
67 44.4 44.7 86.0 
Sometimes we don't have 
enough food 
16 10.6 10.7 96.7 
We often don't have enough 
food 
5 3.3 3.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 150 99.3 100.0  
Missing System 1 .7   




FIGURE 4- Frequencies: Change in food security 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes, positive change 67 44.4 44.7 44.7 
Yes, negative change 4 2.6 2.7 47.3 
No change 79 52.3 52.7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 150 99.3 100.0  
Missing System 1 .7   
Total 151 100.0   
 
Although the plurality of clients gave the response “we have food but not always the 
kinds that we would like”, the margin between the first and second response for this 
question is insignificant. The vast majority of female FINCA Honduras clients thus have 
good or excellent food security within their families. Even more relevant is the finding 
that the majority of clients (52.7%) did not see any change in their family’s food security 
as a result of their loans with FINCA, while a large percentage (44.7%) reported a 
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positive change in food security and a negligible percentage of clients saw a negative 
change. These findings are generally positive for this indicator. Those clients who saw a 
positive change in their food security, although not the technical majority, constitute a 
significant percentage of respondents. Specific client responses attest to FINCA’s impact 
on client food security—many report not only a greater quantity of food eaten by their 
families but better quality and variation of food. For example, Carla Suyapa Perez states 
that “We eat better now in my family: before, it was rare for us to eat meat. Now we have 
it often, and we also don’t have to eat the same exact things every day.”1d However, 
positive changes were not clearly seen in a comparison between new and old clients for 
our original food security question. 
 In Figure 5 we can observe a negligible difference between the response 
percentages of old, middle, and new clients to the food security question. From this 
comparison of response percentages we may conclude that the food security of a client’s 
family does not significantly improve with her time as a FINCA client. However, the 
comparison shown in Figure 6 between new, middle, and old clients for our question on 








d All client names have been changed for confidentiality purposes. 
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FIGURE 5- Food security and time with FINCA 
New/old with FINCA Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
We always eat what we want 19 40.4 40.4 40.4 
We have food but not always 
the kinds of food that we 
would like 
23 48.9 48.9 89.4 
Sometimes we don't have 
enough food 
5 10.6 10.6 100.0 
New Valid 
Total 47 100.0 100.0  
We always eat what we want 24 35.3 35.3 35.3 
We have food but not always 
the kinds of food that we 
would like 
31 45.6 45.6 80.9 
Sometimes we don't have 
enough food 
8 11.8 11.8 92.6 
We often don't have enough 
food 
5 7.4 7.4 100.0 
Middle Valid 
Total 68 100.0 100.0  
We always eat what we want 19 54.3 54.3 54.3 
We have food but not always 
the kinds of food that we 
would like 
13 37.1 37.1 91.4 
Sometimes we don't have 
enough food 
3 8.6 8.6 100.0 
Old Valid 














FIGURE 6- Food security change and time with FINCA 
New/old with FINCA Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes, positive change 13 27.7 27.7 27.7 
Yes, negative change 2 4.3 4.3 31.9 
No change 32 68.1 68.1 100.0 
New Valid 
Total 47 100.0 100.0  
Yes, positive change 35 51.5 51.5 51.5 
Yes, negative change 2 2.9 2.9 54.4 
No change 31 45.6 45.6 100.0 
Middle Valid 
Total 68 100.0 100.0  
Yes, positive change 19 54.3 54.3 54.3 
No change 16 45.7 45.7 100.0 
Old Valid 
Total 35 100.0 100.0  
 
 As seen in Figure 6, only a small percentage of clients who have been with 
FINCA for less than a year report a positive change in their food security (27.7%). 
However, middle and old clients show a clear improvement—the majority of clients in 
these categories have seen a positive change in their food security. Thus, the longer a 
client has been with FINCA, the more likely she is to have seen an improvement in her 
food security. We can even claim that the above analysis is the most significant 
measurement of client empowerment for this indicator of food security, because this 
question explicitly asks the client if she has seen a positive change in her life due to 
FINCA’s help. From this comparison of percentages and the generally positive responses 
for our two questions on food security, we can claim that these female FINCA clients 
have been economically empowered by the organization through the improvement of 
their food security. 
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 The third indicator of economic empowerment tested by this survey is client 
health. This indicator is based on two questions: “How would you rate your health at this 
time?”, and my elaborative question, “Has your health or the health of your family 
changed since the start of your loans with FINCA?” For the first question, clients were 
asked to rate their health from 1 to 5, with the number 1 as “excellent” health and the 
number 5 as “very poor” health. The mean of responses to this question was 2.59, 
demonstrating that the health of most interviewees lies between “good” and “fair”. 
Before administering the survey, I originally hypothesized that a clear difference would 
emerge over time in the health of FINCA clients and their families. However, the 
following time analyses demonstrate a lack of significance in the relationship between 
client health and time with the organization and may suggest no empowerment for female 
FINCA clients in this area. As seen in Figure 7, the two-tailed measurement of 
significance for the correlation between client health and time with FINCA shows no 
significance: its value is .374, while only a .05 value or less would demonstrate a 
significant relationship between the two variables and the dependence of client health on 
time with the organization. 
FIGURE 7- Correlations: Health and Time with FINCA 
  Number of loan 
cycles with 
FINCA 
How would you 
rate your health 
at this time? 
Pearson Correlation 1.000 .073 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .374 
Number of loan cycles with 
FINCA 
N 151.000 151 
Pearson Correlation .073 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .374  
How would you rate your 
health at this time? 
N 151 151.000 
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The following ANOVA analysis for equality of means, as seen in Figures 8 and 9, also 
suggests that there exists no relationship between time as a FINCA client and client 
health. The mean responses for this question show almost no variance between new, 
middle, and old clients (from 2.51 to 2.66), and the ANOVA test for significance between 
these means shows a value very far from the .05 significance benchmark: .687. This test 
therefore proves the relative equality of client responses between new, middle, and old 
clients and suggests a lack of improvement in health over time for female FINCA clients. 
FIGURE 8- Health and Equality of Means for time with FINCA 
How would you rate your health at this 
time? 
     
 95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound Minimum Maximum 
New 47 2.51 .930 .136 2.24 2.78 1 4 
Middle 68 2.66 1.045 .127 2.41 2.91 1 5 
Old 35 2.66 .906 .153 2.35 2.97 1 5 




FIGURE 9- Health and ANOVA significance for time with FINCA 
How would you rate your health at this time?    
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .722 2 .361 .377 .687 
Within Groups 140.851 147 .958   
Total 141.573 149    
 
  
Our second question on health, which asked clients if the health of their families 
had changed since the start of their loans with FINCA, demonstrates more positive results 
as an indicator of economic empowerment: 
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FIGURE 10- Frequencies: Change in Family Health 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes, positive change 72 47.7 47.7 47.7 
Yes, negative change 3 2.0 2.0 49.7 
No change 76 50.3 50.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 151 100.0 100.0  
 
As the response percentages in Figure 10 demonstrate, many female clients of FINCA 
have shown signs of empowerment by the organization through improvement of their 
health. Although the statistical majority of interviewees reported no change at all in their 
health since they had become FINCA clients, a substantial percentage (47.7%) of clients 
reported a positive change in their health or the health of their families. The details 
provided by interviewees in response to this question on changes in their health were also 
overwhelmingly positive. Blanca Emilia Cruz Jiménez reports that “I use part of my 
loans to take my mother to the doctor when she needs it, and to buy her medicines. We 
almost never get sick, with FINCA’s help.”2 Olga Maribel Carrasco explains that “Since I 
started with FINCA, my foot problems have gotten better. Before, to make my living I 
had to walk all day selling my products. Now I can hold my business in my home—I 
have better health, and I can take care of my children.”3 Again we can claim that 
responses to this question are most relevant in measuring FINCA’s empowerment impact 
on the client, because the question asks the interviewee directly about changes in her 
health due to FINCA’s help. The fact that close to half of all interviewees report a 
positive impact on their health speaks well for FINCA’s general ability to empower its 
female clients, despite the lack of significant improvement in client responses to this 
question from new to old clients: 
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FIGURE 11- Change in family health and time with FINCA 
New/old with FINCA Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes, positive change 19 40.4 40.4 40.4 
No change 28 59.6 59.6 100.0 
New Valid 
Total 47 100.0 100.0  
Yes, positive change 37 54.4 54.4 54.4 
Yes, negative change 2 2.9 2.9 57.4 
No change 29 42.6 42.6 100.0 
Middle Valid 
Total 68 100.0 100.0  
Yes, positive change 15 42.9 42.9 42.9 
Yes, negative change 1 2.9 2.9 45.7 
No change 19 54.3 54.3 100.0 
Old Valid 
Total 35 100.0 100.0  
 
The general equality of responses between new, middle, and old clients shown in Figure 
11 may simply demonstrate that approximately half of female clients have been 
economically empowered by FINCA through the improvement of their health, although 
this empowerment has no relationship with client time with the organization. These 
results, in combination with the lack of significant relationships found earlier between 
client time with FINCA and client health, present us with a mixed perspective on client 
health as an indicator of economic empowerment. We can claim that although many 
female FINCA clients have seen marked improvements in their health, FINCA still has 
significant progress to make in order to consistently empower its female clients in this 
area of health. 
 Our fourth indicator of economic empowerment is education of the client’s 
children. Two questions on education were administered in the FCAT survey, one that 
asked how many school-aged children lived in the client’s household, and a subsequent 
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question that asked how many of those children attended school. What the FCAT survey 
lacks in this area of child education is a question that asks for the level of education 
reached by children of clients or for the amount of schooling that the client plans for her 
children to reach. Questions such as these would measure more clearly the impact of a 
client’s membership with FINCA on her children’s level of education and thus on the 
economic empowerment of the client’s family through this indicator of schooling. 
However, using the given survey, I hypothesized that over time FINCA clients would 
send more of their children to school. However, the following comparison of new, 
middle, and old client responses through ANOVA test for equality of means disproves 
my hypothesis: 
 
FIGURE 12- Child education and Equality of Means for time with FINCA 
  95% Confidence 










Bound Minimum Maximum 
New 47 2.06 1.451 .212 1.64 2.49 0 6 
Middle 68 2.16 1.681 .204 1.75 2.57 0 8 
Old 35 1.63 1.457 .246 1.13 2.13 0 6 
How many school-
aged children live 
in your home? 
Total 150 2.01 1.565 .128 1.75 2.26 0 8 
New 47 1.96 1.382 .202 1.55 2.36 0 6 
Middle 68 1.93 1.765 .214 1.50 2.35 0 8 
Old 35 1.43 1.335 .226 .97 1.89 0 6 
How many of these 
children attend 
school? 








FIGURE 13- Child education and ANOVA significance for time with FINCA 
  Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 6.793 2 3.396 1.394 .251 
Within Groups 358.201 147 2.437   
How many school-aged 
children live in your 
home? 
Total 364.993 149    
Between Groups 7.021 2 3.511 1.445 .239 
Within Groups 357.119 147 2.429   
How many of these 
children attend school? 
Total 364.140 149    
  
As seen above under “means” in Figure 12, new, middle, and old clients all have 
approximately two children and send both of those two children to school. There is thus 
no significance in the difference between these nearly identical responses, as 
demonstrated by our ANOVA test for significant equality of means—the values .251 and 
.239 do not reach the significance value of .05. We cannot gain any information or 
analysis from this data. We cannot say that the education level of clients’ children has 
improved, nor that it has not improved—it seems to have always been essentially ideal, as 
all children in clients’ households are attending school. Of course, this ideal frequency of 
education is not a reality in Honduras. These two questions seem simply to fail to capture 
an accurate and detailed picture of the education of the children of FINCA clients—its 
frequency, its quality, and the level of education reached by the child. For this fourth 
indicator of economic empowerment through the education of children, we can therefore 
make no statement on the empowerment or lack thereof of FINCA’s female clients.  
 The final indicator of economic empowerment as measured by this survey is 
satisfaction with FINCA’s policies with regards to loan amount, loan cycle, and interest 
rate. It is based on questions on the client’s current loan amount, loan cycle length, and 
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interest rate, and their subsequent opinion on those numbers. Client satisfaction with 
FINCA is also not an ideal indicator of the economic empowerment of these female 
clients because it simply alludes to the interviewee’s ability to manage her business and 
her finances. There exist no specific questions in this FCAT survey that address the 
success of the client’s business or her financial comfort and progress. I recognize these 
limitations, and through my analysis of this indicator I find mixed results for economic 
empowerment, as client opinion is generally very positive on loan amount, loan cycle, 
and interest rate, but seems to worsen over time. These opinions are based on an average 
loan amount of 8825.33 lempiras ($490.30), an average loan cycle of 6.08 months, and an 
average interest rate of 2.9 percent. Figures 14-16 demonstrate a high satisfaction with 
FINCA’s policies, as over 60 percent of clients report loan amount, loan cycle, and 
interest rate as “just right.” 
 
FIGURE 14- Loan amount ratings frequencies 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Too big 3 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Just right 97 64.2 64.7 66.7 
Too small 50 33.1 33.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 150 99.3 100.0  
Missing System 1 .7   









FIGURE 15- Loan cycle length ratings frequencies 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Too long 6 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Just right 103 68.2 68.7 72.7 
Too short 41 27.2 27.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 150 99.3 100.0  
Missing System 1 .7   
Total 151 100.0   
 
FIGURE 16- Interest rate ratings frequencies 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Too high 51 33.8 34.0 34.0 
Just right 98 64.9 65.3 99.3 
Too low 1 .7 .7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 150 99.3 100.0  
Missing System 1 .7   
Total 151 100.0   
 
These high satisfaction rates suggest that FINCA empowers its female clients by 
providing them with supportive and effective financial services that enable them to grow 
their small businesses and improve their savings efficiently. However, the following 
comparisons in opinion between client categories present other conclusions. 
When we compare the responses of new, middle and old clients for these opinion 
questions, a difference emerges between the views of the three groups—middle and old 
clients express a worse opinion of loan cycle and interest rate than new clients. Initial 
comparisons in values for loan amount, loan cycle, and interest rate between new, 
middle, and old clients is relevant to this analysis:  
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FIGURE 17- Loan opinions and Equality of Means for time with FINCA 
  95% Confidence 










Bound Minimum Maximum 
New 47 5329.79 3409.126 497.272 4328.83 6330.74 500 15000 
Middle 68 8560.29 5378.763 652.271 7258.36 9862.23 2000 25000 
Old 35 14034.29 15540.742 2626.865 8695.85 19372.72 1000 80000 
What is the 
amount of your 
current loan? (in 
lempiras)? 
Total 150 8825.33 9053.615 739.225 7364.62 10286.05 500 80000 
New 47 5.17 1.090 .159 4.85 5.49 1 8 
Middle 68 6.28 1.709 .207 5.87 6.69 4 10 
Old 35 6.91 2.536 .429 6.04 7.79 4 14 
What is the 
current length of 
your loan cycle in 
months? 
Total 150 6.08 1.895 .155 5.77 6.39 1 14 
New 26 .0296 .00147 .00029 .0290 .0302 .02 .03 
Middle 49 .0294 .00199 .00028 .0289 .0300 .02 .03 
Old 30 .0309 .00581 .00106 .0288 .0331 .02 .06 
What is the 
interest rate of 
your current loan? 
(percentage) 
Total 105 .0299 .00349 .00034 .0292 .0306 .02 .06 
  
 
As Figure 17 demonstrates, client loan amount logically doubles over time from new to 
old clients, as the client improves her business and revenue and is able to take out larger 
loans. Meanwhile, loan cycle and interest rate stay generally constant. The following 
comparison of responses for opinions demonstrates that both new and old clients are 
satisfied with the amount of their loans despite the large discrepancy in value. However, 
for relatively equal loan cycle length and interest rate, new and old clients show a 





FIGURE 18- Loan amount ratings and time with FINCA 
New/old with FINCA Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Too big 1 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Just right 30 63.8 63.8 66.0 
Too small 16 34.0 34.0 100.0 
New Valid 
Total 47 100.0 100.0  
Too big 2 2.9 2.9 2.9 
Just right 44 64.7 64.7 67.6 
Too small 22 32.4 32.4 100.0 
Middle Valid 
Total 68 100.0 100.0  
Just right 23 65.7 65.7 65.7 
Too small 12 34.3 34.3 100.0 
Old Valid 
Total 35 100.0 100.0  
 
 
FIGURE 19- Loan cycle length ratings and time with FINCA 
New/old with FINCA Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Too long 3 6.4 6.4 6.4 
Just right 36 76.6 76.6 83.0 
Too short 8 17.0 17.0 100.0 
New Valid 
Total 47 100.0 100.0  
Too long 1 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Just right 43 63.2 63.2 64.7 
Too short 24 35.3 35.3 100.0 
Middle Valid 
Total 68 100.0 100.0  
Too long 2 5.7 5.7 5.7 
Just right 24 68.6 68.6 74.3 
Too short 9 25.7 25.7 100.0 
Old Valid 




FIGURE 20- Interest rate ratings and time with FINCA 
New/old with FINCA Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Too high 9 19.1 19.1 19.1 
Just right 37 78.7 78.7 97.9 
Too low 1 2.1 2.1 100.0 
New Valid 
Total 47 100.0 100.0  
Too high 30 44.1 44.1 44.1 
Just right 38 55.9 55.9 100.0 
Middle Valid 
Total 68 100.0 100.0  
Too high 12 34.3 34.3 34.3 








Why are those respondents who have been FINCA clients for over a year less likely to 
state that loan cycle and interest rate are “just right”? It seems that these clients may have 
become more financially frustrated as a result of their loans with FINCA and have found 
it more difficult to manage and return their loans as time goes on. Thus female clients of 
FINCA Honduras have not been economically empowered as suggested by these 
comparisons between new, middle, and old client opinions. But equally important is the 
simple fact that within each client category, the majority of interviewees still reports that 
loan amount, loan cycle length, and interest rate are “just right”. Our original analyses 
show that over sixty percent of these interviewees are satisfied with FINCA’s financial 
services. Therefore we cannot reach a concrete conclusion on FINCA’s ability to 
economically empower its female clients through the providence of effective and 
manageable microloans. 
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 A review of these five indicators of economic empowerment reveals a general 
lack of consensus on the empowerment of female FINCA Honduras clients in terms of 
improvements in family expenses, food security, health, education of children, or 
satisfaction with FINCA. My original hypotheses, which predicted significant differences 
in responses to these questions between new and old clients and significant correlations 
between responses and client time with FINCA, were mostly incorrect. Only food 
security as an indicator saw clear improvements in clients’ lives, and health also showed 
relatively positive, although at times mixed, results. The sporadic nature of these results 
may largely be due to the shortcomings of this FCAT survey. Indicators such as family 
expenses and education of children showed significant flaws and limitations as valid 
measures of economic empowerment. Other important indicators were not measured at 
all by the survey, such as the female client’s financial independence or ability to 
contribute to family income. We may claim, in fact, that the FCAT survey questions on 
food security and on health were the only effective ones within this category of economic 
empowerment, and thus that food security and health are our most valid indicators of the 
economic empowerment of FINCA’s female clients. This perspective in turn gives our 
results a more positive light. Now, we turn to the next form of possible empowerment for 







FINCA and Psychological Empowerment 
 The indicators of psychological empowerment measured by this FCAT survey 
data fall into two categories: confidence and happiness. These categories are based on 
specific questions or groups of questions within the survey that address clients’ 
confidence, changes in confidence over time, and general happiness with their lives. Each 
question within this category of psychological empowerment has been analyzed either for 
a correlation with the client’s time with FINCA Honduras or for equality of means 
between new and old clients. I originally hypothesized that older clients would show 
greater confidence and happiness in their responses to these questions. Results of my data 
analysis have been mixed in this respect: certain percentages, comparisons and 
correlations show evidence of psychological empowerment, while others do not. 
 Our first indicator of psychological empowerment as measured by the FCAT 
survey is client confidence, based on two survey questions: “Do you feel capable and 
confident to make important decisions that could change the course of your life?” and my 
elaborative question, “Have you felt a change in this confidence since the start of your 
loans with FINCA?” For the first question, clients could choose responses on a scale 
from 1 to 4, with the number 1 as “totally capable”, 2 as “mostly capable”, 3 as “neither 
capable or incapable”, and 4 as “mostly incapable”. The mean of responses was 1.38, and 
70.9% of clients reported that they were “totally capable” and confident to make 
important decisions that could change their lives. Another 19.9% percent responded that 
they felt “mostly capable.” Client descriptions reflect this high level of confidence among 
female FINCA clients. Rita Xiomara Portillo articulates that “I feel very capable to do 
my work on my own. I am married but I am working with this FINCA loan all by myself 
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and I don’t need anyone else to help me pay for it.”4 María Isabel Cruz López declares, “I 
like to be prosperous, so I work very hard and I never feel useless. I’m a woman who 
fights for what she wants and FINCA gives me the opportunity to always continue that 
fight.”5 From these statements it is clear that whether FINCA has specifically impacted 
their confidence or not, these women possess a positive sense of agency and self-worth.  
Most importantly, my elaborative question also yielded positive results—the 
majority of clients (51.7%) stated that they had seen a positive change in their confidence 
since the start of their loans with FINCA, while 7.3% saw a negative change and 41.1% 
reported no change in confidence. These analyses suggest the psychological 
empowerment of FINCA’s female clients, as the vast majority demonstrates high levels 
of confidence and the majority state that their confidence has improved since they began 
working with FINCA. The following comparisons between new and old clients and 
correlations between confidence and time with FINCA suggest otherwise: 
 
FIGURE 21- Confidence and Equality of Means for time with FINCA 
Do you feel capable and confident to make important decisions that could change the course of 
your life? 
 
 95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound Minimum Maximum 
New 47 1.57 .878 .128 1.32 1.83 1 4 
Middle 68 1.46 .871 .106 1.24 1.67 1 4 
Old 35 1.23 .490 .083 1.06 1.40 1 3 







FIGURE 22- Confidence and ANOVA significance for time with FINCA 
Do you feel capable and confident to make important decisions that could change the course 
of your life? 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 2.432 2 1.216 1.891 .155 
Within Groups 94.528 147 .643   
Total 96.960 149    
 
 
FIGURE 23- Correlations: Psychological factors and Time with FINCA 
  
Number of loan cycles 
with FINCA 
Do you feel capable 
and confident to make 
important decisions that 
could change the 
course of your life? 
Pearson Correlation 1.000 -.107 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .189 
Number of loan cycles with 
FINCA 
N 151.000 151 
 
As seen in Figure 22, no significance (a value of .155) was found in the difference 
between new, middle and old clients’ mean responses to this question on confidence. It is 
interesting to note that confidence in fact declines from new to old clients, although this 
decline is not statistically significant. As well, Figure 23 shows that no significant 
correlation (.189) was found between time as a FINCA client and client confidence. Thus 
it seems from this data analysis that client confidence does not improve over time. A 
comparison between new, middle, and old clients for our second elaborative question, 
which asks explicitly if clients have felt a change in confidence, also shows no 
improvement from new to old clients in positive responses. As seen in Figure 24, 
between the three client categories the percentage of respondents who reported a positive 
change in their confidence stays around 50%.  
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FIGURE 24- Change in confidence and time with FINCA 
New/old with FINCA Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes, positive change 25 53.2 53.2 53.2 
No change 22 46.8 46.8 100.0 
New Valid 
Total 47 100.0 100.0  
Yes, positive change 36 52.9 52.9 52.9 
Yes, negative change 7 10.3 10.3 63.2 
No change 25 36.8 36.8 100.0 
Middle Valid 
Total 68 100.0 100.0  
Yes, positive change 17 48.6 48.6 48.6 
Yes, negative change 4 11.4 11.4 60.0 
No change 14 40.0 40.0 100.0 
Old Valid 
Total 35 100.0 100.0  
 
More interesting here is the increase from new to old clients in reported deterioration of 
confidence since the start of their loans with FINCA. Not a single interviewee who has 
spent less than a year with the organization reports feeling damage to her confidence due 
to working with FINCA. However, 11% of those who have been FINCA clients for over 
four years report a negative change in their confidence since the start of their loans with 
FINCA. These statistical differences suggest that FINCA’s initial impact on the female 
client, if any, is always positive. It may even suggest that the new FINCA client feels 
more optimistic in general about her capabilities to shape the future of her business and 
her family. The long-term impact of FINCA’s services on women is slightly more mixed, 
however, as about 10% of clients seem to lose confidence in themselves, possibly due to 
stress from the organization’s high financial demands or discouragement at the failure of 
a specific business venture. This percentage of unsatisfied clients is small, however. The 
simple fact remains that 51.7% of women interviewed—the majority of respondents—
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have felt a positive change in their confidence due to FINCA’s services. This statistic 
alone, because it is self-reported by the clients, outweighs any of our analyses and 
comparisons between new, middle, and old clients in search for signs of improvement in 
client confidence over time. Therefore we can state that confidence, as an indicator of 
FINCA’s empowerment of its female clients, has yielded positive results. 
 The second indicator of psychological empowerment as measured by this survey, 
client happiness, is based on the question “In general, how satisfied are you with your 
life?” Clients were asked to place their response on a scale from 1 to 10, with the number 
1 as “extremely unsatisfied” and the number 10 as “extremely satisfied”. The mean of 
responses was 8.31, indicating high client happiness. However, because the FCAT survey 
lacks a control group, we cannot deduce from this result that client happiness was 
dependent on FINCA’s services, or that happiness was caused or improved by the client 
working with FINCA. Just as we could not attribute the highly positive client confidence 
ratings to FINCA’s support without also reporting the results to an elaborative question 
on change in confidence, we now must turn to a data analysis of improved happiness over 
time in order to analyze FINCA’s true effect on the client’s happiness. The following 
comparisons between new, middle and old clients and correlations between happiness 
and time with FINCA suggest a negligible empowerment impact on female clients for the 






FIGURE 25- Happiness and Equality of Means for time with FINCA 
In general, how satisfied are you with your 
life? 
     
 95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound Minimum Maximum 
New 47 8.15 1.888 .275 7.59 8.70 4 10 
Middle 68 8.21 1.959 .238 7.73 8.68 1 10 
Old 35 8.69 2.111 .357 7.96 9.41 1 10 
Total 150 8.30 1.972 .161 7.98 8.62 1 10 
 
FIGURE 26- Happiness and ANOVA significance for time with FINCA 
In general, how satisfied are you with your life?    
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 6.882 2 3.441 .883 .416 
Within Groups 572.618 147 3.895   
Total 579.500 149    
 
 
FIGURE 27- Correlations: Psychological factors and Time with FINCA 
  Number of loan 
cycles with 
FINCA 
In general, how 
satisfied are you 
with your life? 
Pearson Correlation 1.000 .147 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .072 
Number of loan cycles with 
FINCA 
N 151.000 151 
 
We see above in Figure 25 that there is only the smallest difference between new, middle, 
and old client satisfaction with life. On a scale from 1 to 10, all three groups of clients 
reported approximately “8” as the number to measure their general happiness. The 
ANOVA test for significant equality of means, shown in Figure 26, yields no significance 
whatsoever (.416). As well, the relationship shown in Figure 27 between time with 
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FINCA and happiness approaches significance at .072 but does not reach the benchmark 
of .05 to demonstrate a significant correlation. These data analyses demonstrate no clear 
impact of FINCA’s support on client happiness. Interviewees report very high happiness 
in general (an average of 8.31), but as discussed, we cannot attribute this happiness to 
FINCA’s help without the use of a control group. This inability to connect client 
responses with FINCA’s help may have been balanced by a specific question on any 
changes in the client’s happiness since she had begun her loans with FINCA. I made the 
research error of overlooking the importance of such a question in my administration of 
the FCAT survey. Therefore, as measured by this second indicator of client happiness, 
female FINCA clients have not experienced any statistically proven psychological 
empowerment.  
 Our analysis of these two indicators of psychological empowerment, client 
confidence and client happiness, have yielded mixed results. Most significantly, findings 
showed that the majority of female clients interviewed for this survey reported feeling an 
increase in their confidence since they began as clients with FINCA. With this data we 
could make the argument that female FINCA clients have indeed been psychologically 
empowered. A glimpse of optimism thus reveals itself in this investigation of 
psychological indicators of empowerment. Our second indicator of psychological 
empowerment, happiness, demonstrates that female FINCA clients have a generally high 
level of satisfaction with their lives. Our statistics show no significance, however, in 
measuring FINCA’s role in creating or improving this client happiness. The results of this 
data analysis for psychological empowerment have proved more positive than those for 
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economic empowerment, but it still remains open for debate whether these female 
FINCA Honduras clients are being psychologically empowered by the organization. 
 
FINCA and Socio-cultural Empowerment 
The final form of female empowerment arguably made possible by microfinance 
organizations is socio-cultural empowerment. FINCA’s standardized FCAT survey 
administered one question on household roles that can be used to measure socio-cultural 
empowerment: “Are you the head of the household?” Answers to this question can be 
used to analyze gender roles within marital relationships and families in general. In the 
Spanish version of this question, the connotation of the phrase “head of the household” 
specifically refers to holding the directive role in the family. A substantial shortcoming of 
this FCAT survey is the lack of additional questions that could be used as indicators of 
the socio-cultural empowerment of female clients. More effective questions in this 
category may have asked the female client about her relationship with her husband or 
other male members of the family and her specific responsibilities in the household, or 
about her role as a woman in the community. Although I could not specifically 
administer such questions, I was able to capture details on these indicators from certain 
clients by recording their elaborative comments, which I will also review in this section. 
Before administering this FCAT survey, I hypothesized that those women who 
had been with FINCA for more time would be more likely to be the heads of their 
households. General percentages of responses do show positive results for this question, 
but responses show no clear improvement from new to old clients and are significantly 
affected by the outside variable of civil status. As seen in Figure 28, the majority of 
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female clients reported that they were the heads of their households. In Figure 29’s 
comparison between new and old clients, no clear trend of improvement or deterioration 
is seen in the percentage of clients who are the heads of their households: 
FIGURE 28- Head of household frequencies 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes 79 52.3 53.0 53.0 
No 70 46.4 47.0 100.0 
Valid 
Total 149 98.7 100.0  
Missing System 2 1.3   
Total 151 100.0   
 
 
FIGURE 29- Head of household and time with FINCA 
New/old with FINCA Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes 22 46.8 47.8 47.8 
No 24 51.1 52.2 100.0 
Valid 
Total 46 97.9 100.0  
Missing System 1 2.1   
New 
Total 47 100.0   
Yes 39 57.4 58.2 58.2 
No 28 41.2 41.8 100.0 
Valid 
Total 67 98.5 100.0  
Missing System 1 1.5   
Middle 
Total 68 100.0   
Yes 17 48.6 48.6 48.6 
No 18 51.4 51.4 100.0 
Old Valid 




It seems from the above analyses that female clients who have spent many years with 
FINCA Honduras are no more likely to be the heads of their households than those who 
have just began as FINCA clients. But it is much more crucial to examine the salient 
variable of civil status in relationship with responses to this question—any single mother 
is the head of her household by default, and not by empowerment through the 
improvement of gender roles within her marriage. The strong effect of civil status on 
whether a female client runs her household is displayed in Figure 30: 
FIGURE 30- Crosstabulation: Head of household, time with FINCA, and civil status  
New/old with FINCA 
Civil status New Middle Old Total 
Count 11 16 7 34 Yes 
% within New/old 
with FINCA 
73.3% 88.9% 63.6% 77.3% 
Count 4 2 4 10 No 
% within New/old  26.7% 11.1% 36.4% 22.7% 
Count 15 18 11 44 
Single Are you the head of 
the household? 
Total 
% within New/old  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Count 4 7 7 18 Yes 
% within New/old  33.3% 29.2% 46.7% 35.3% 
Count 8 17 8 33 No 
% within New/old  66.7% 70.8% 53.3% 64.7% 
Count 12 24 15 51 
Married Are you the head of 
the household? 
Total 
% within New/old  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Count 7 16 3 26 Yes 
% within New/old  36.8% 64.0% 33.3% 49.1% 
Count 12 9 6 27 No 
% within New/old  63.2% 36.0% 66.7% 50.9% 
Count 19 25 9 53 
Open union (union 
libre) 
Are you the head of 
the household? 
Total 
% within New/old  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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The total response percentages shown in bold above for the categories of single, 
married, and open union clients reveal that the vast majority (77.3%) of single female 
clients are also the heads of their households. (The 22.7% of these single women who are 
not the heads of their households generally live with fathers, mothers, or grown sons who 
assume the household head role.) When we examine responses given by married clients, 
we find very different percentages—only 35.3% of married female clients reported that 
they were the heads of their households. This clear difference suggests that a married 
Honduran woman, even if she is a microfinance client, remains likely to hold a secondary 
role to her husband in the home. Interestingly, those clients in open unions with a lifelong 
partner instead of in a formal marriage showed an almost equal split between “yes” and 
“no” responses to this question. This discrepancy between married clients and those in 
open unions suggests that the flexibility of an open union could encourage Honduran men 
to provide more voice and influence to their wives than the rigidity of a marriage, which 
may give men the comfort to treat their wives with more forceful authority.  
Notwithstanding, the most significant difference that we see in this analysis of civil status 
and head of household responses lies between single and married clients. Married clients 
are unlikely to be the heads of their households—but are they more likely over time with 
FINCA to assume this role? To analyze FINCA’s possible empowerment impact on a 
client’s family role within the context of her civil status, we observe the response 
percentages for new, middle, and old clients within these civil status categories. 
 Not surprisingly, single female clients show no significant increase or decrease in 
their likelihood to be the heads of their households over time. The clear majority of these 
women are already in charge of their families by default, and thus FINCA has little effect 
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on their roles within the home. For married clients we see a small increase in the 
likelihood that the client will be the head of her household—from 33.3% for new clients 
to 46.7% for old clients. However, this positive trend is too small to be considered truly 
significant in terms of measuring FINCA’s empowerment impact on these female clients 
and the gender roles in their homes. Clients in open unions also demonstrate no clear 
trend in their likelihood to be the heads of their households between new, middle, and old 
clients. Upon examination of new, middle, and old female client responses to this 
question within the context of civil status, we find no significant relationship between 
FINCA’s services and the woman’s role in the home. Whether a female FINCA client is 
the head of her household depends much more on her civil status than on her time with 
the organization. Thus we have found no evidence of socio-cultural empowerment for the 
female clients of FINCA Honduras in this survey. 
 The elaborative comments made by female interviewees on this question about 
household roles also yielded important insights on the continuation of powerful gender 
norms in Honduran society, despite any efforts of microfinance organizations or other 
NGOs to socio-culturally empower women. Among those interviewees who were married 
or in open unions, multiple women expressed an internalization of gender norms and 
skewed power relations within their marital relationships, and readily accepted the 
superiority of their husbands in the home. For example, Natalia García states, “My 
husband is the head of the household because he is the man in the relationship! A woman 
always has to ask permission of her husband—I can’t say ‘I’m going to do this or that’ 
without talking to my husband first.”6 Financial differences between husband and wife 
also frequently impacted the same gender imbalance of familial roles. Paola Maylen 
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Ordóñez Rivera reports, “My husband is the head of the household and I’m a help to him. 
He has steady work in construction and makes more money than I do, and for that reason 
he has the responsibility.”7  
Whether for socially normative or financial power differences, the vast majority 
of women in long-term matrimonial or open union relationships expressed a clear power 
difference within their homes between husband and wife. These women had generally 
come to accept the gender discrepancy in family roles, and as traditional “amas de casa” 
(housewives), to take on all housework regardless of increased or changing 
responsibilities in their businesses as a result of their loans with FINCA. Valentina 
Espinosa Díaz explains that, although she has seen an increase in her business’ success 
and thus in her daily workload since she began her loans, her household chores have not 
decreased. She declares, “I run my convenient store all day, but I also continue doing all 
the housework—clothes, food, childcare… everything.”8 These client testimonies support 
our survey results above, which demonstrate a complete lack of impact of FINCA’s 
services on the female client’s role in her home. Through our survey data and interviewee 
descriptions, the permanence of cultural gender norms in Honduras becomes clear. Deep-
set cultural beliefs are difficult to change and their transformation often takes a process of 
many years—a process that no one non-profit organization can catalyze on its own. 
Therefore it is not surprising that FINCA Honduras has not succeeded in socio-culturally 
empowering its female clients as measured by our FCAT survey. 
 From this FCAT survey administered in June and July 2009 with female clients of 
FINCA Honduras, we have found mixed results in terms of the empowerment of women 
through microfinance. Our five indicators of economic empowerment as measured by this 
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survey—family expenses, food security, health, child education, and financial satisfaction 
with FINCA—demonstrated certain positive changes in the lives of female clients as well 
as a lack of impact in other areas. The food security and health of interviewees showed 
the clearest positive change due to the help of FINCA’s services. Our indicators of 
psychological empowerment presented the best results in terms of empowerment—a clear 
improvement in confidence was seen among the female clients interviewed, and client 
happiness was high (despite our inability to specifically attribute that happiness to 
FINCA’s help). Finally, our indicator of socio-cultural empowerment, household roles, 
and related elaborations by interviewees on gender relations in the home clearly 
demonstrated FINCA’s lack of impact on female clients in this area. No clear change was 
seen in women’s marital relations or roles in the household due to the client’s 
membership with FINCA. In my final chapter, I will now address the possible 
explanations for these results in terms of the economic, psychological, and socio-cultural 
empowerment of FINCA’s female clients, and offer my current perspectives on the 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS 
 Microfinance has been promoted worldwide as a tool for the alleviation of 
poverty and the empowerment of women. In light of my study with the female clients of 
FINCA Honduras, I question the ability of microfinance to achieve these aims for 
impoverished women. Microfinance organizations do not always succeed in the 
economic, psychological, and socio-cultural empowerment of their female clients. The 
151 female FINCA Honduras clients interviewed in our survey have experienced partial 
improvements in their standard of living and clear improvements in their level of self-
confidence, but have seen no change in gender norms and power imbalances within their 
homes since they began the FINCA program. The empowerment impact of FINCA’s 
services on their lives has thus been limited. It is encouraging, however, that the female 
clients of FINCA Honduras have generally not demonstrated any of the negative impacts 
on their lives that have been found in some studies on women and microfinance, such as 
debilitating debt or increased domestic violence among partners. FINCA Honduras has 
proved itself a supportive and efficient institution in serving its clients, but does not 
currently have the capacity to fully empower its female clients through economic, 
psychological, and socio-cultural changes in their lives. 
 My investigation of the economic empowerment of female FINCA Honduras 
clients suggests that FINCA actively improves the standard of living of Honduran women 
within the bounds of their economic class. However, it is unable to substantially pull the 
female client out of poverty due to Honduras’ entrenched socioeconomic hierarchy. With 
FINCA’s help, important improvements were seen in the food security and health of 
clients’ families, but indicators measuring the money that a client lives on per day 
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revealed a harsher reality—that women as clients of FINCA Honduras cannot 
substantially change their financial situations through microloans. Microfinance has 
allowed these women to subsist comfortably and even to improve the well-being of their 
families, but a Honduran woman’s socioeconomic status is not likely to change with the 
efforts of one non-profit organization. The significant reduction of poverty in Honduras 
would require widespread structural reforms that the non-profit sector does not possess 
the influence or the tools to accomplish. 
 Although FINCA Honduras does not have the capacity to significantly improve 
the economic well-being of its female clients, it could enhance its economic 
empowerment impact through the implementation of a more effective “credit-plus” 
model of microfinance and through the provision of individual loans. FINCA Honduras 
currently provides its clients with obligatory savings accounts and micro health 
insurance, which require the client to pay monthly deposits and payments. FINCA clients 
expressed repeated frustration with the fact that these extra services depleted their savings 
but were not tailored to their specific needs. For example, FINCA’s health insurance only 
covers hospital visits, which is problematic because many rural clients have no nearby 
access to a hospital. It would be more beneficial for clients, perhaps, if these aspects of 
FINCA’s credit-plus microfinance model were made voluntary in order to grant the client 
more financial independence. As well, individual loans should be made more easily 
available to clients—a frustration expressed by interviewees was the inability to manage 
one’s finances without the burden of group responsibilities. The improved flexibility of 
FINCA Honduras’ credit-plus services and the increased availability of individual loans 
could improve this organization’s economic empowerment of its female clients—it could 
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provide them with greater financial independence from the organization and thus the 
ability to better manage their own profits and savings.  
 My investigation of the psychological empowerment of female FINCA Honduras 
clients suggests that the organization has been successful in this regard, and supports a 
correlation between increased economic independence and agency and increased self-
confidence for Honduran women. The FCAT survey findings suggest that FINCA 
Honduras need not be concerned with measures to empower its female clients 
psychologically, because increased self-confidence is a natural byproduct or outcome of 
an individual’s increased ability to manage her finances and improve her success in 
business. By measure of this survey with female FINCA clients, FINCA Honduras has 
played an instrumental role in the psychological empowerment of Honduran women.  
Finally, my examination of the socio-cultural empowerment of FINCA’s female 
clients yields no significant results and suggests that socio-cultural changes in the lives of 
Honduran women are far too difficult for this microfinance organization to generate on 
its own. The impact of machismo and strong normative gender divisions in the home 
within Honduran culture have become clear through the testimonies of these female 
clients. The socio-cultural empowerment of women in any society is an extremely 
complex process, as it requires the undermining of tightly knit social structures that have 
been in place for centuries and, most importantly, that have been internalized by men and 
women alike. Cultural norms such as these Honduran familial gender roles are deep-set 
social phenomena that one microfinance organization cannot hope to overturn.  
FINCA Honduras may be able to moderately increase familial gender equality for 
women through specific socio-cultural empowerment programs, as part of its credit-plus 
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model. Some microfinance organizations worldwide have aimed to tackle gender 
inequalities with client education programs, as outlined in Chapter 2. Through the 
implementation of programs such as educational workshops on reproductive rights or 
gender equality, FINCA could possibly trigger positive socio-cultural changes for its 
female clients, by granting them the knowledge and the tools to seek equality in the home 
and the community. Some microfinance institutions have proven successful in their 
attempts to socio-culturally empower their clients by these educational means. If FINCA 
Honduras chose to address the socio-cultural empowerment of Honduran women, it could 
enhance its credit-plus services with educational programs to promote gender equality. 
 This thesis has added one modest investigation to the large pool of worldwide 
research on women’s empowerment through microfinance. My survey with 151 female 
clients of FINCA Honduras falls in line with previous studies that present doubtful, 
ambiguous, or negative results on microfinance’s ability to empower women. As I have 
discussed, FINCA Honduras’ inability to economically and socio-culturally empower its 
female clients can be attributed to the deep-set socioeconomic hierarchies and cultural 
gender norms that prevail in Honduras. In contrast, the psychological empowerment that 
these women have successfully achieved is most likely a natural byproduct of their 
increased financial independence and agency with FINCA. FINCA Honduras fails to 
fully empower the female client through its small financial services, and stands as a 
testament to the weakness of non-profit organizations against national structural 
inequalities. The true alleviation of poverty in developing nations requires vast structural 
readjustments that could only be accomplished by government programs or powerful 
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international organizations such as the IMF or the World Bank—not by the modest non-
profit sector.  
Unfortunately, third world governments and international organizations have 
made inadequate efforts to address structural socioeconomic inequalities, and have 
instead endorsed microfinance as a panacea for global poverty. The world has responded 
to this endorsement and celebrated the idea of microfinance because it provides a solution 
that is too simple to be true: through one small loan, a poor individual can allegedly 
transform her impoverished life into one of financial success and agency, and step by step 
world poverty will be reversed. But we must not be so easily fooled, lest we allow 
poverty and structural inequality to fester and spread underneath the band-aid of 
microfinance’s rhetoric. Microfinance has generated important financial opportunities for 
poor entrepreneurs worldwide, but its promises may not be enough to combat the global 
wealth gap that continues to expand in this era of globalization. We must question the 
popular narrative of microfinance and empowerment, and continue to seek more complex 
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